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LIST OF PARTIES 
The following are parties to this appeal: 
1. Ali S. Yazd and Parvin Yousefi ("Appellees"), plaintiffs below and 
respondents/appellee. 
2. Woodside Homes Corporation ("Woodside"), defendant below and 
petitioner/appellant. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2-5 and Rule 45 of the UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Woodside had knowledge of defective soil conditions on the property 
sold to Appellees/Respondents. 
2. Whether conditions existing on a parcel of land near the property sold to 
Appellees/Respondents were material to the conditions existing on Appellees/Respondents' 
lot, whether Woodside knew of those conditions or had a duty to discover them, and whether 
Woodside had a duty to disclose the conditions on the nearby parcel. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case. 
Ali Yazd and Parvin Yousefi filed a lawsuit against Woodside accusing Woodside of 
engaging in fraudulent conduct by intentionally concealing or failing to disclose to Appellees 
information that allegedly reveals the existence of collapsible soils beneath the house 
Woodside constructed for Appellees. To establish their claims, Appellees were required to 
show by clear and convincing evidence that Woodside knew about the existence of 
collapsible soils on Appellees' lot and failed to disclose such information. Appellees' 
attempted to do this by alleging Woodside had such knowledge from a soils report for an 
adjoining parcel of property. 
Appellees were unable to produce evidence to support their claims. Instead, the 
evidence shows that Woodside removed all the collapsible soil of which it was aware from 
beneath Appellees' house prior to its construction. Because Appellees could not and cannot 
meet their burden, the district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of 
Woodside. 
Appellees appealed the district court's decision. The Court of Appeals declined to 
hold oral argument on the appeal and therefore made its decision on the briefs submitted by 
the parties. The Court of Appeals filed its decision on February 25, 2005. See Yazd v. 
Woodside Homes. 2005 UT App. 82, 109 P.3d 393. In its decision, the Court of Appeals 
reversed and remanded the district court's entry of summary judgment concluding that there 
were issues of fact concerning when Woodside obtained the information contained in a soils 
report covering a neighboring parcel of land. See KL at ^ [15. 
B, Course of Proceedings. 
Appellees filed their complaint against Woodside on April 27,2002 asserting claims 
for relief for fraudulent concealment, fraudulent non-disclosure, breach of warranty, mutual 
mistake and unilateral mistake. (R. at 000-011.) In response, Woodside filed a motion to 
dismiss and compel arbitration. (R. at 15-17.) Judge Schofield granted the motion in part, 
ordering that Appellees' contract claims were subject to arbitration. (R. at 106-109.) On 
August 25, 2003, Woodside filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining fraud 
claims based on Appellees' failure to provide clear and convincing evidence that Woodside 
was aware of collapsible soils on Appellees' lot. (R. at 393-537.) In an order dated 
November 19, 2003, Judge Stott granted Woodside's motion for summary judgment. (R. at 
904-906.) (Copies of the district court's Ruling and Order are included in the Addendum 
hereto at Tabs A and B, respectively.) Appellees filed their notice of appeal from that order 
on November 25, 2003. (R. at 907-908.) 
While this appeal was pending, Appellees chose to pursue their contract claims that 
were subject to arbitration. The arbitration on Appellees' contract claims was held on 
September 14-15, 2004, and the arbitrator awarded damages to Appellees to compensate 
them for the cost of repairing their house. (See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Moot filed with the Court of Appeals on November 
19,2004 at 2 and Ex. A thereto.) The district court entered an Order Confirming Arbitration 
Award and Judgment on October 21, 2004, and Appellees' counsel signed a Satisfaction of 
Judgment on November 1, 2004. (Copies of the Order Confirming Arbitration Award and 
Judgment and Satisfaction of Judgment are attached as Exs. B and C, respectively, to the 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Moot.) 
In light of the arbitrator's award and entry of Satisfaction of Judgment, Woodside 
filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Moot on November 19, 2004. The Court of Appeals 
denied Woodside's Motion to Dismiss in its opinion issued on February 25, 2005, wherein 
it also reversed and remanded the district court's grant of summary judgment. (A copy of 
the opinion is included in the Addendum hereto at Tab C.) Woodside filed a Petition for 
Rehearing with the Court of Appeals on March 11, 2005. The Court of Appeals denied the 
Petition for Rehearing in an Order dated April 12, 2005. Subsequently, Woodside filed a 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court on May 12, 2005. Woodside's Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari was granted in an Order from this Court dated July 18, 2005. 
C Statement of Material Facts.l 
1, Woodside owned land that became the Panorama Point subdivision 
("Subdivision") located in Lindon, Utah. (R. at 521-524, 720.) 
1
 As is mentioned in Woodside's Petition for Certiorari, its statement of material facts 
is taken primarily from its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 
at 533-536.) Appellees did not dispute facts 1-8 and 12-13 in the district court. (R. at 720-
722.) In addition, Appellees failed to comply with Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-
501(2)(b), which was then in effect and has since been codified in Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 7, in their effort to dispute Woodside's facts 9-11 and 15-18 (R. at 764-768) 
because Appellees failed to "specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which 
[they] relie[d]" in attempting to raise an issue of fact. UTAH R. JUD. ADMIN. 4-501(2)(b). 
Because Appellees failed to dispute the facts underlying Woodside's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, those facts must be deemed admitted for purposes of this appeal. See kl The 
Court of Appeals did not mention Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-501(2)(b) in its 
opinion and did not deem Woodside's facts admitted. Fact 14 comes directly from the Delta 
Report, which Appellees rely on in their attempt to show Woodside engaged in fraudulent 
conduct. 
A 
2. In preparation for the construction of the Subdivision, Woodside requested that 
a geotechnical engineering firm now known as Amec ("Amec") conduct an investigation of 
the soils in the Subdivision and provide a report (the "SHB Report") (R. at 471-514) of that 
investigation to Woodside. (R. at 517, 521-524, 721.) 
3. Amec drilled eight test pits throughout the Subdivision ranging in depth from 
ten to twelve feet from which they evaluated the condition of the soil. (R. at 512, 721.) 
4. The SHB Report disclosed that "[t]he most significant geotechnical aspect of 
the site is the upper one and one-half to two and one-half feet of soil which are moisture-
sensitive, collapsible" and recommended the removal or compaction of the collapsible soils. 
(R. at 507, 721.) 
5. On or about April 8, 1992, Delta Geotechnical Consultants Inc. prepared a 
geotechnical study ("Delta Report") for the LDS Church for a site neighboring the 
Subdivision ("Church Site") where the LDS Church was contemplating the construction of 
a stake center, which is a large meetinghouse. (R. at 409-454, 721.) 
6. The Delta Report disclosed the presence of "6 to 16 feet of loose sandy silt 
underlain by loose to medium dense silty sand." (R. at 449, 721.) 
7. The Delta Report did not include an analysis of the soil in the Subdivision, 
generally or specifically, or for lot 304 ("Lot 304"), the lot purchased later by Appellees. (R. 
at 450, 721.) 
8. Subsequent to the completion of the Delta Report, Woodside purchased the 
Church Site from the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the LDS Church ("CPB"). (R. 
at 523, 721.) 
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9. Blaine Livingston, the CPB representative, did not personally deliver a copy 
of the Delta Report to anyone at Woodside. Instead, Livingston followed his standard 
practice of preparing a copy of the Delta Report and instructing an assistant to mail a copy 
of the Delta Report to Woodside. Mr. Livingston's assistant did not send the Delta Report 
to Woodside by registered mail or certified mail. Mr. Livingston does not know if the Delta 
Report was actually received by Woodside. (R. at 406-407.) 
10. Woodside did not see a copy of the Delta Report until some time in 1997, 
which is long after the Appellees moved into their home on Lot 304. (R. at 646.) 
11. Woodside discussed the Church Site with William Gordon, the soils engineer 
who prepared the SHB Report, and believed that the soil conditions at the Church Site were 
the same as the soil conditions disclosed in the SHB Report. Woodside also understood that 
the project that the LDS Church was considering involved a large single structure, that was 
significantly different in form and character, as well as its impact on the land, from the single 
family homes that Woodside was planning to build. (R. at 534.) 
12. On or about March 11, 1995, Appellees entered into a Purchase Agreement 
("Agreement") with Woodside for the construction of a house on Lot 304 of the Subdivision. 
(R. at 535, 721.) 
13. The property upon which Lot 304 is located was covered by the SHB Report. 
(R. at 471, 721.) 
14. The closest test hole to Lot 304 discussed in the Delta Report, test hole 6, is 
120 feet away from a corner of Appellees' lot and reveals the presence of collapsible soils 
to a depth of five feet (R. at 429, 436 (the scale of which is P=60').) 
15, During the construction of Appellees' house, six to eight feet of soil were 
removed from Lot 304. (R. at 403-04 ("[t]he mass excavation has been completed and 
extends anywhere from six to eight feet below original grade "); R. at 400.) 
16. Before the foundation for Appellees' house was laid, engineer Gordon visited 
Lot 304 to inspect the mass excavation. He determined that the underlying soils would 
support the house and made certain recommendations concerning the placement and 
compaction of structural fill. Gordon's conclusions and recommendations are contained in 
a field report he provided to Woodside ("Field Report"). (R. at 403-04.) 
17. Woodside understood that the mass excavation of Lot 304 had removed all 
collapsible soils from Lot 304. (R. at 400.) 
18, Woodside followed the recommendations made by Gordon in the Field Report 
before laying the foundation for Appellees' house. (R. at 400.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"On certiorari, [this Court] review[s] the court of appeals' decision for correctness, 
focusing on whether that court correctly reviewed the trial court's decision under the 
appropriate standard of review." Hansen v. Evre, 2005 UT 29, [^8, 116 P.3d 290 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). "When reviewing a court's decision to grant summary 
judgment, [the Court] examinefs] the court's legal conclusions for correctness." Smith v. 
Four Corners Mental Health Ctr.. Inc.. 2003 UT 23, % 13, 70 P.3d 904 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Tin1 ilr,I1 . ' ( " I ' u ' i H i l l ' delumined th.il AppHlw • wilt" unable In shun l»> Icai 
and convincing evidence that Woodside was aware of adverse soil conditions on the lot they 
purchased from Woodside. Because Woodside had no knowledge of adverse soil conditions 
on Appellees' lot, it follows that Woodside did not fraudulently conceal or fail to disclose 
that Woodside understood that all collapsible soils were ivnu IN etl Ironi beneath ppdlt/tV 
house prior to construction. The Court of Appeals ignored the undisputed facts in its opinion 
and incorrectly reversed the district court's decision. 
'"'
?
' I I LSI* i ' 1 : . - • - . » . » < \i ' ' His " \ , S ,11, 
emphasizes the contents of the Delta Report, which analyze- * >u - >• * ..*-... i .» 
of property adjacent to a corner of Appellees' lot. Contrary to the Court of Appeals 
conclusion, the Delta Report was not material to the conditions on Appellees' lot because it 
due no) ailcliev, tlit1 MIIIII i oniliiMin mi Appellees lol <nul is consistent w it! :t the knowledge 
that Woodside had concerning soil conditions < npellees' lul In ixlihliun, (In1 Cumi of 
Appeals misconstrued the contents of th e Delta Report, concluding that it disclosed 
information that it simply does not contain. This conclusion incorrectly colored the Court 
ot Appeals' tlelrniiiii.idiui lli.il llir I h li.i Kcpon \\A\ in,in nnl I In; i in (disputed facts also 
showed that Woodside did not possess the Delta Report nor was it aware of tl ic spec ific 
conclusions contained in the Delta Report until approximately two years after Appellees' 
house was built. 
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals created an onerous new duty for builders. The 
Court of Appeals' ruling as it presently stands will require every builder and developer to 
discover conditions not only on the property they are selling but on neighboring property as 
well. Further, what constitutes neighboring property is unclear. A builder will then be 
required to provide all of the information it finds concerning neighboring property, as well 
as any information learned by others, to the potential buyer or be subject to fraud liability. 
Such an expansive duty is unrecognized by this or any other court. The correct duties a 
builder must fulfill under Utah law are set out in Fennell v. Green. UT App. 291, 77 P.3d 
339, and Smith v. Frandsen. 2005 UT 55,94 P.3d 919. (Copies of the Fennell and Frandsen 
opinions are included in the Addendum hereto at Tabs D and E, respectively.) The court of 
appeals did not apply Fennell and incorrectly applied Frandsen to the facts of this case. A 
proper application of FenneU and Frandsen to the present case shows that Woodside fulfilled 
all of its duties to Appellees. 
ARGUMENT 
L WOODSIDE DID NOT HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF DEFECTIVE SOIL 
CONDITIONS ON APPELLEES1 LOT. 
In order to prevail on a claim of fraudulent concealment, "a plaintiff must prove the 
following three elements: (1) the nondisclosed information is material, (2) the nondisclosed 
information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to 
communicate." Mitchell v. Christensen, 31 P.3d 572, 574 (Utah 2001), Similarly, 
"[fraudulent concealment requires that one with a legal duty or obligation to communicate 
certain facts remain silent or otherwise act to conceal material facts known to him." 
o 
McDougal v Weed, 945 I 2 1 1 5 5, 1 ; 9 (I Ital i " \ { \\ ,199 ] r) " I I lei efi >re, I >< >tl > fraudulent 
nondisclosure and fraudulent otuvaliiinil ivi|imr llnil ilir niiiortii,ilioii thai is n I His* I ' \nl 
be known to the party who did not disclose it. In addition, a plaintiff bears the burden of 
proving fraud by clear and convincing evidence. See Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter Day Saints, ^ •:., cf. Colorado v. Western Paving Const. 
Co.. 833 F,2d 86 - - • m. > 
fraudulent nondisclosure claim). 
Based on the undisputed facts found by the district court, which the Court of Appeals 
fail sd to deem i idi i iitted, tl le disti let ecu n t held that: 
(1) prior to construction, Woodside was aware of the existence of collapsible soils on 
Plaintiffs' lot to a depth of two and one-half feet; (2) between six and eight feet of soil 
was removed during the excavation for Plaintiffs' house; (3) after inspecting the 
excavation, a soils engineer indicated to Woodside that the underlying soils would 
support the Plaintiffs' house; (4) Woodside followed the recommendations of the soils 
engineer in laying the foundation of Plaintiffs' house; and (5) during construction and 
after the completion of Plaintiffs' house, Woodside understood that all of the 
collapsible soils had been removed from Plaintiffs' lot. Plaintiffs have not 
demonstrated that Woodside had any knowledge of remaining collapsible soils on 
Plaintiffs' lot. Therefore, Plaintiffs failed to raise any issue of material fact that 
would preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of Woodside. 
(R. at 900.) The undisputed facts thus showed that Woodside had no knowledge of defective 
soil -Miifhliliuib uii tin jpn»|K'il> sold to Appellees. 
Rather than deeming the undisputed facts ptvsnitnf h\ Wnndsidi imhf. HIMHI i nd 
admitted, as required by Utah Rule Judicial Administration 4-501(2)(b), and reviewing the 
district court's decision for correctness, the Court of Appeals sought to create issues of fact 
th.t s * co\ irt and did i lot impact Woodside's actual knowledge 
of the soil conditions on Appellees' 1< »t "I he lyi icl IJ )ii i c A tl ie C< >i n t c »f Appc als' decision is 
its conclusion that the Delta Report is material as a matter of law and should have been 
disclosed to Appellees. This conclusion was based on a misreading of the Delta Report and 
a failure to evaluate Woodside's actual knowledge of the soil conditions on Appellees' lot. 
As a result, the Court of Appeals incorrectly reversed the district court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Woodside. 
The Court of Appeals incorrectly states that the Delta Report revealed the existence 
of collapsible soils at a depth of thirty feet at a test hole that was "no more than" thirty feet 
away from Appellees' lot. Yazd, 2005 UT App. 82, ffif 4, 9. This finding is unsupported by 
the record. In fact, the record shows that the area covered by the Delta Report only borders 
a far comer of Appellees' lot, and the nearest test hole discussed in the Delta Report was 
more than 120 feet away from Appellees' lot. (R. at 436.) Test hole 6 is 120 feet away from 
the southwest comer of Appellees' lot (and an even greater distance from Appellees' house) 
and does not reveal the existence of collapsible soils to a depth of thirty feet. Instead, it 
reveals collapsible soils to a depth of five feet, which is less than the normal depth of 
excavation for constructing a house foundation and less than the amount of soil that was 
excavated from Appellees lot (six to eight feet of soil were removed from Appellees' lot). 
(R. at 400,403-04,429,900.) Such information would therefore not change the fact that as 
far as Woodside knew all collapsible soils would be and were removed from Appellees' lot. 
Further, contrary to what is stated in the Yazd opinion, the disclosure of collapsible soils at 
a depth of thirty feet is not found anywhere in the Delta Report. The Delta Report, 
discussing the general condition of the soil on the Church Site, states "the [twelve] test holes 
encountered 6 to 16 feet of loose sandy silt underlain by loose to medium dense silty sand." 
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i| \{ \\ liQ \ Ciivf'ii 'ill (lull mi' Mii»iii|!ii(ii'il in i i|ii» (h llli.i ll"n,(Nn( iiiiilniii!1 in it changes the 
knowledge that Woodside had about the* soil tonditioir in ipptlUvs ini HI V iiodsnilr •, 
understanding that all collapsible soils related to construction of the home were removed 
from Appellees" lot.2 
Complete^ M i ^ -- decision is a discussion ol ^hat 
knowledge Woodside had at the time '\ \ •> <!.,••- s < tsotnstnKlnl ntm/h is Iherenlnil 
issue to establishing Appellees' claims. While it is undisputed that Woodside did not have 
the Delta Report until two years after Appellees' house was built, Woodside has stated that 
lini |nii|H>ses ol iliis apjK -il, (In1 'i iMI111 <iin impuU ^. Knowledge contained in the Delta 
Report to Woodside. With that imputed knowledge 
light most favorable to Appellees, the facts found by the district court would only be changed 
as follows: (1) prior to construction, Woodside was aware of the existence of collapsible 
tub mi \ppiiia • In! In ,i nit fillli ml (<\ ojtid tine-halt 1'eet and in a test pit 120 feet away from 
a corner of Appellees' lot to a depth of five feet; (2) betw een six ai id eigl it feet c f soi 1 ;as 
removed during the excavation for Appellees' house; (3) after inspecting the excavation, a 
soils engineer indicated to Woodside that the underlying soils would support the Appellees' 
liousi , (-I) \\ IMMIMIIC inllnw t\l (In1 laomnu'iidulions ol the soils engineei in laying the 
foundation of Appellees' house; and (5) during constnulinn ,nul .il'lei l!n' I'oniplclinr »l 
2The fact that Woodside received a specific report for Appellees' lot, after the lot had 
been excavated from six to eight feet below original grade, stating that u[t]he underlying soils 
are the natural clayey silts which when undisturbed will adequately support footing designed 
to impose maximum net bearing pressure of 1,500 pounds per square foot" further supports 
the conclusion that Woodside understood that all collapsible soils were removed from 
Appellees'lot (R. at 403.) 
Appellees' house, Woodside understood that all of the collapsible soils had been removed 
from Appellees' lot. Even with the information in the Delta Report imputed to Woodside, 
Appellees are unable to provide any evidence demonstrating that Woodside had knowledge 
of the presence of collapsible soils on Appellees' lot. Because there is no evidence to 
support Appellees' allegations of fraudulent conduct, the Court should reverse the decision 
of the Court of Appeals and affirm the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor 
of Woodside. 
II. THE CONDITIONS DISCLOSED IN THE DELTA REPORT ARE NOT 
MATERIAL TO THE CONDITIONS ON APPELLEES' LOT AND DO NOT 
CREATE DUTIES OF DISCOVERY OR DISCLOSURE FOR WOODSIDE. 
The Court of Appeals put a great deal of emphasis on the contents of the Delta Report 
and Delta Report's relevance to Appellees' lot. The Court of Appeals fundamentally misread 
the Delta Report, however, and in so doing, created an unreasonable and onerous new burden 
for builders and developers. 
A. The Conditions on the Parcel of Land Near Appellees' Lot Were Not 
Material to the Conditions on Appellees' Lot. 
The Court of Appeals correctly states that this Court has previously held "that 
materiality is something which a buyer or seller of ordinary intelligence and prudence would 
think to be of some importance in determining whether to buy or sell." Hermansen v. 
TasuHs, 2002 UT 52, ^ 29, 48 P.3d 245 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).3 
3The holding of Smith v. Frandsen. 2004 UT 55, 94 P.3d 919, which is discussed 
below, indicates that information about neighboring parcels is not material as a matter of law. 
Under Frandsen, a buyer is required to request information about adjoining parcels before 
a seller has a duty to provide it. See Frandsen at ^ 16. 
i i 
TheCou -1 Appeals ,n^  n ^ 
of the Delta Report, that the Delta Report would have been of some interest and i flin < >iv 
material. This conclusion ignores the facts of the case and applicable case law. 
1 Ihe Delta Report Does Not Discuss the Conditions on Appellees' 
I ,ot 
As an initial matter, il *> uiidispukil Ilia! the Dcll.i KVporl docs noi Jiscn .., tun i. i( 
intended to discuss, the soil conditions on Appellees' Lot. (R. at 450, 721.) It discusses the 
Church Site. The Delta Report does not discuss the construction of single-family homes on 
llif < "linn In Silt III \ iis whether a large slab-on-grade meetinghouse, 
which is significantly different from a singK ' -, should in-1 onstrui uxi in 
Church Site. Again, the nearest test pit to Appellees' lot is located 120 feet from a comer 
ofAppellees lot. (K at 429 ..436.619.) Finally, the Delta Report does not reveal anything 
MIMI ', '""itntdiets« h tl Woodsuk knew »IIMHI« Appellees5 lot, that surface level collapsible soils 
were present on the lot that would be ren io\ ed clt irii lg coi isti i lctioi i Gi /ei i. tl iese facts, tl ic 
Court of Appeals was incorrect to conclude that the Delta Report is material as a matter of 
law. Indeed, these facts show that the Delta Report was immaterial to the conditions on 
i Vppellees' lot. • 
2. The Delta Report is Consistent with 
Report and the Field Report, 
1! o SHB Report reveals the existence of collapsible soils to a depth of 2Vi feet in the 
;
 : eport reveals the existence of collapsible soils to a depth 
of five feet 120 feet away fron i Appellees' lol ! lie Field Report,, wlneli is (he only report: 
that addresses the specific soil conditions on Appellees' lot and superse< les tl ie ii if it n n i.f...i.• it i 
contained in both the SHB Report and the Delta Report, concludes that the soils below six 
to eight feet on Appellees' lot would support Appellees' house.4 There is nothing 
inconsistent between the SHB Report, the Delta Report and the Field Report. Both the SHB 
Report and the Delta Report reveal the existence of shallow collapsible soils in the area 
around Appellees' lot. The Field Report confirms that during the excavation for Appellees' 
house, all of the collapsible soils disclosed in the SHB Report and the Delta Report were 
removed from Appellees' lot. The Delta Report was not inconsistent with the information 
Woodside had, and Woodside took appropriate steps to make sure that the collapsible soils 
disclosed in the Delta Report and SHB Report were removed from Appellees' lot prior to 
laying the foundation for Appellees' house. Therefore, the information contained in both 
reports was immaterial. 
3. The Court of Appeals' Finding of Materiality is Based on a 
Misreading of the Delta Report. 
As is discussed above, the Court of Appeals misconstrued the actual contents of the 
Delta Report. This misreading impacted the Court of Appeals' analysis of materiality. It is 
understandable that if a builder had a soils report that indicated that collapsible soils were 
present thirty feet from a lot to a depth of thirty feet, such information might be material. But 
4The crucial inquiry is what material information was known to Woodside at the time 
Appellees' house was constructed. Having obtained a soils report for the general conditions 
in the Subdivision and aware of the LDS Church's decision not to build a large 
meetinghouse, Woodside took reasonable steps to confirm that Appellees' lot was suitable 
for construction. Woodside then obtained a specific report that indicated that Appellees' lot 
was indeed suitable for construction. Under Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App. 291, 77 P.3d 
339, once Woodside had the Field Report for Appellees' lot, any other information about 
nearby parcels was immaterial. 
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revealed collapsible soils to a depth of five feet at .1 tv4 pi 120 led u\s:i\ Iron" i n>?m ' of 
Appellees' lot. (R. at 429,436.) fhat information is not material given that more than that 
amount I MH! ^ould be (and in fact was) removed during construction and in light of the 
coi itei its o f tl le F iel(I R eport,<". \ 11 n • 11i" o 111. \ i«i s i111 e \ i 1111 i 11 a 11 u 11 o 111 u' s oils below a depth of five 
feet on Appellees' lot 
I T h e Court of Appeals has Created an Onerous New Duty for 
Bui lders and Developers that Unreasonably Exposes Them to 
Fraud Liabil ity W h e n No Fraud has Occurred, 
1 1 :te Coi ii t : f \ ppea ls ' i i dii ig as it pi esei itl> stai ids w ill si lb ject builders to fraud 
liability unless they disclose every piece of information coiKriiiiii! flu™ aiea siii'i in Him In 
parcel they are selling that may be "of some interest to the buyer ," regardless of whether the 
ormat ion pertains to the condit ions on the properly being purchased, regardless of whether 
I In* I nm si* o( iinniiui rons lnu 0 >n rlimiiiitln; the i nmjifimi <is described til the information, 
and regardless of whether the buyer has requested the informatic >n It = 1 101 .1 :1 ;:: il •>« : 1 >e 
emphas ized that there is no evidence that Woods ide even possessed the Del ta Report during 
(lit i.' I n tint tinii1 frame, If tl le Delta Report is considered material based upon the facts of 
this case, builders will be ^uhp'*! '<» I'uud liahtio,, u n l r 1 mi'm p i u u d e every piece of 
information concerning not only their subdivision but the surrounui u* u-
notwi ths tanding the specific efforts the builder makes to de termine suitability for 
u>n .liiitdoii .IIHI in ttjuK problems for their p ro jec t 5 It is instructive that no other court has 
5There is no need for the Court to create a duty for builders that lowers the threshold 
for proving fraud as the Court of Appeals did in this case. Buyers still have available to them 
recognized such a draconian duty. To impose such a duty, especially in the context presented 
here of deep subsurface soil conditions on other property, would create uncertainty and 
litigation regarding disclosure obligations. 
B. Woodside Did Not Possess the Delta Report Until After it Constructed 
Appellees' House and Did Not Have a Duty to Discover Conditions on 
Adjacent Property, 
1. Woodside Did Not Possess the Delta Report Until After Appellees' 
House was Constructed. 
The undisputed facts show that while Woodside was aware of the general conclusions 
of the Delta Report and that the LDS Church decided not to construct a large meetinghouse 
on the parcel covered by the Delta Report, it was not in possession of the Delta Report nor 
aware of the specific findings of the Delta Report until after Appellees' house was built. 
(See Undisputed Facts 11-13 supra.) Appellees raised nothing more than speculation below 
to contradict these facts, and pursuant to Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-501(2)(b), 
those facts must therefore be deemed admitted. 
2. Woodside Did Not Have a Duty to Investigate Neighboring Parcels. 
Woodside's responsibility as a builder is to make sure that a subject lot is suitable for 
construction. See Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, «([ 16. This duly does not impose a burden on 
Woodside to investigate neighboring parcels, and to create such a duty would essentially 
transform fraud claims into more easily proved negligence claims. Woodside's duty is to 
all of the contractual remedies they negotiate in the contract to purchase property and/or a 
house. Just as Appellees pursued their contract claims in this case in arbitration and were 
compensated by Woodside for those claims, a buyer can pursue a contractual action against 
a builder and be compensated for any economic loss without creating duties for builders that 
will make it impossible for them to avoid fraud claims. 
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kiiun ol Ihc roihlitioiis (in lli<; ',uh|crl lull, In llii\ rusr, ^ Yitoihidi" obl.tined the SI IB R eport 
for the Subdivision and the Field Report for Appellees' lot and had no further obligation to 
discover conditions on neighboring parcels. If Woodside is aware of adverse conditions on 
neighboring land, it has a responsibility to make sure that those conditions are not present on 
fitc :\:ii!'»((Yi l<i( See Fennel! v. (Jieen, :'U«h I I I \[iji "'ill ' I" M l^'i In IIIIK u s e , 
Woodside fulfilled its duty under applicable Utah law.6 Woodside was not unuci J > 
discover conditions on neighboring property. 
If a court were to impose a duty to investigate neighboring parcels on a builder, it is 
builder's failure to investigate a parcel on the other side of a mountain could subject it to 
fraud liability. It would be unreasonable to impose such a burden on builders. 
3, Even if the Court Imputes Knowledge of the Contents of the Delta 
Report to Woodside, It Does Not Change the Knowledge Woodside 
had Concerning Appellees' Lot. 
Woodside did not possess the Delta Report at the time Appellees' house was 
constructed and was not aware of its specific findings. Nevertheless, at oral argument before 
the district court atid iii tlle briefing to the Court of Appeals and this Court, Woodside has 
contents of the Delta Report to Woodside. The Court of Appeals failed to impute such 
knowledge in its ruling. Crediting Woodside with knowledge of the contents of the Delta 
Report does not change the fact that tl le Delta R epoi t does not reveal the presence of 
6Woodside's di ity i 11 iclc t i: ipplical >k I Jtal i lb i i;v is desci ibed it 11 noi e detail 1: »elov ' 
i c 
collapsible soils o n Appellees' lot or that Woodside removed collapsible soils from 
Appellees' lot at a depth greater than what was revealed in the Delta Report.7 
C. Woodside Did Not Have a Duty to Disclose the Delta Report to Appellees, 
The Court of Appeals concluded that if Woodside had knowledge of the contents of 
the Delta Report it had a duty to disclose it. This holding creates a duty that contradicts both 
precedents of the Court of Appeals and of this Court. 
1. Under Fennell v. Green. 2003 UT App. 291, a Builder Has No Duty 
to Disclose Potentially Adverse Information About Neighboring 
Property if a Report on the Subject Lot Shows That the Adverse 
Condition Does Not Exist There. 
The Court of Appeals' opinion incorrectly states that "[t]he sole basis for the district 
court's grant of summary judgment was its conclusion that Woodside did not know of the 
Delta Report prior to selling the property to the Buyers. The district court assumed that the 
presence of collapsible soils on the adjacent lot was material and, for purposes of the motion, 
Woodside did not dispute its duty to disclose." Yazd, 2005 UT App. 82, ffif 6, 12 n. 3. The 
district court did not base its grant of summary judgment ou whether Woodside possessed 
the Delta Report and, in fact, assumed that Woodside had the report. (R. at 897-902, 904-
906.) Instead, the district court based its ruling on the holding in Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT 
App. 291, stating "[Appellees] have not demonstrated that Woodside had any knowledge of 
remaining collapsible soils on [Appellees'] lot. Therefore, [Appellees] failed to raise any 
issue of material fact that would preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of Woodside." 
7The nearest test pit from the Delta Report, which was 120 feet away, does not reveal 
collapsible soils below five feet. The mass excavation of Appellees' Lot for the construction 
of the Yazd home went down to depths of six to eight feet. 
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(R. at 900.) The district court properly understood the issue as whether Woodside had any 
knowledge of collapsible soils remaining on Appellees' lot. It is undisputed Woodside did 
not. 
The facts in Fennell are remarkably similar to the facts here. The Court of Appeals, 
however, did not follow or even mention Fennell in its opinion. Fennell stands for the 
proposition that a builder has no duty to disclose potentially adverse information about 
neighboring property if a report on the subject lot shows that the condition does not exist 
there. In other words, once Woodside received a specific report for Appellees' lot indicating 
that it was suitable for construction, it did not have a duty to disclose anything. See Fennell 
2003UTApp.29l,1f 12. 
In FenneU, the builder was aware of potential landslide conditions and retained the 
services of a soils engineer to assess the plaintiffs lot. See id at ^  11. Here, Woodside was 
aware of the presence of collapsible soils on the surface in the area and retained the services 
of a soils engineer to assess the soil conditions on Appellees' lot. (R. at 403-04.) In Fennell 
the soils engineer determined that, if his recommendations were followed, the lot in question 
was not susceptible to landslides and was suitable for the construction of a residence. See 
k l at ^ 11. Here, after inspecting the mass excavation for Appellees' house, the soils 
engineer concluded that all collapsible soils had been removed and that the soils on 
Appellees' lot would support the construction of a residence. (R. at 403-04.)8 
8The contents of the Delta Report did not contradict the soils engineer's conclusions, 
nor are the contents of the Delta Report intended to address the soils conditions on 
Appellees' lot. (R. at 450.) The Delta Report discloses the existence of collapsible soils to 
a depth of five feet at a distance of 120 feet from a corner of Appellees' lot. (R. at 429, 
The facts in Fennell showed that the defendants had a report showing a landslide 
condition, but followed the engineer's recommendations to make plaintiffs lot suitable for 
construction of a residence. The Fennell panel 
determine[d] that FennelPs fraudulent nondisclosure claim against [the developers] 
failjed] because there were no facts presented to show that [the developers] knew of 
a possible landslide condition on [plaintiffs] l o t . . . . Indeed, such knowledge was 
refuted by [the soils engineer], who conducted the required soils report of [plaintiff s] 
lo t . . . and stated in his deposition that he did not believe that [plaintiffs] lot . . . was 
a landslide area . , . . Because [plaintiff] cannot establish that [the developers] had 
knowledge of any such information, it necessarily follows that there can be no duty 
to disclose the information to [plaintiff]. 
ML at HH 11-12. 
Here, the district court concluded that the following facts were undisputed: 
(1) prior to construction, Woodside was aware of the existence of collapsible soils on 
[Appellees'] lot to a depth of two and one-half feet; (2) between six and eight feet of 
soil was removed during the excavation for [Appellees'] house; (3) after inspecting 
the excavation, a soils engineer indicated to Woodside that the underlying soils would 
support the [Appellees'] house; (4) Woodside followed the recommendations of the 
soils engineer i n laying the foundation of [Appellees'] house; and (5) during 
construction and after the completion of [Appellees'] house, Woodside understood 
that all of the collapsible soils had been removed from [Appellees'] lot. 
(R. at 900, 905.) These undisputed facts show that Woodside had no knowledge of the 
existence of collapsible soils on Appellees' lot even assuming that it was aware of the 
contents of the Delta Report. Because Appellees could not produce any evidence to show 
Woodside knew of collapsible soils on their lot, the district court correctly concluded that 
Woodside had no duty to disclose the Delta Report to Appellees. (R. at 899.) The Court of 
435-46.) More than five feet of soil was removed during the excavation of Appellees' lot. 
(R. at 403-04.) 
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Appeals erred by failing to apply the holding ofFennell to the undisputed facts of this case 
and therefore the ruling of the Court of Appeals should be reversed. 
2. Under Smith v, Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, a Builder Has No Duty to 
Disclose Information About Nearby Parcels Absent Inquiry From 
the Buyer. 
Instead of following the standard established by this Court in Smithy. Frandsen, 2004 
UT 55, the Court of Appeals created a greatly expanded duty that a builder must follow in 
order to avoid liability for fraud. Under Frandsen, a builder does not have a duty to provide 
information about nearby parcels absent an inquiry from the buyer. Frandsen,2004 UT 55, 
^[16. In Yazd, the Court of Appeals ignored this standard and held that a builder has the 
affirmative duty to disclose information, without an inquiry, about conditions on property 
other than the property being sold. Yazd, 2005 UT App. 82, ^ f 15. 
In Frandsen, this Court reiterated the duty a developer owes to a purchaser. A 
developer has 
"a duty to exercise reasonable care to insure that the subdivided lots are suitable for 
construction of some type of ordinary, average dwelling house, and he must disclose 
to his purchaser any condition which he knows or reasonably ought to know makes 
the subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential building. He has a further duty to 
disclose, upon inquiry, information he has developed in the course of the subdivision 
which is relevant to suitability of the land for its expected use." 
Frandsen. 2004 UT 55, U 16 (quoting Loveland v. Orem City Corp.. 746 P.2d 763,769 (Utah 
1987) (emphasis added)). Based on the undisputed facts, Woodside fulfilled its duty under 
the Frandsen standard. 
In order to ensure that the lot purchased by Appellees was "suitable for construction 
of some type of ordinary, average dwelling house," Woodside first obtained a soils report for 
22 
the entire Subdivision. (R. at 471-514.) That report revealed the presence of collapsible soils 
to a depth of 2l/2 feet throughout the Subdivision. (R. at 507.) Although Woodside did not 
have the Delta Report at the time in question, the Delta Report revealed collapsible soils to 
a depth of five feet in the test pit nearest to Appellees' lot, 120 feet away. (R. 429,435-36.) 
Woodside knew that more than five feet of soil would be removed during construction of 
the homes in the Subdivision, and, in fact, Woodside removed the top six to eight feet of soil 
from Appellees' lot. (R. at 403-04.) Woodside then asked a soils engineer to inspect the 
mass excavation of Appellees' lot. The engineer concluded that the underlying soils would 
support the proposed structure. (Id.) As the district court properly concluded, these 
undisputed facts show that Woodside had no knowledge of any condition that made 
Appellees' lot unsuitable for its intended use, and knowledge of the contents of the Delta 
Report would not change that. Therefore, Woodside was under no obligation to disclose any 
further information to Appellees. See Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769. 
The Court of Appeals greatly expanded the holding of Frandsen by concluding that 
Woodside had a duty to disclose the Delta Report if it possessed it. Woodside would have 
been under a further duty to disclose the Delta Report had Appellees made an inquiry and had 
Woodside not obtained a specific report for Appellees' lot. The record, however, is 
completely devoid of any evidence showing that Appellees made such an inquiry. Despite 
this, the Court of Appeals concludes that the information Woodside should have 
affirmatively taken upon itself to disclose, without any inquiry from the buyer, was 
information that did not alter Woodside's knowledge of the soils on Appellees' lot and that 
Woodside did not have. Under a proper reading of Frandsen, Woodside had no duty to 
disclose anything to Appellees about nearby parcels of land. In Yazd, the Court of Appeals 
incorrectly created a duty where none previously existed and should therefore be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is undisputed that Woodside was not aware of the presence of collapsible soils 
beneath Appellees' house. Absent knowledge of such conditions, Woodside had no duty to 
convey any information to Appellees, and therefore did not engage in fraudulent conduct. 
To the contrary, Woodside made every reasonable effort to ensure that Appellees' lot was 
suitable for construction. A soils engineer told Woodside that there were no collapsible soils 
beneath Appellees' house and that the underlying soils would support the proposed 
construction. The information in the Delta Report does not contradict Woodside's 
knowledge about Appellees' lot, and because it does not even address the soil conditions on 
Appellees' lot is immaterial as to whether Woodside engaged in fraudulent conduct. The 
Delta Report simply does not change Woodside's understanding that collapsible soils were 
not present beneath Appellees' house. Because the Delta Report is immaterial, Woodside had 
no duty to communicate its existence or contents to Appellees. As such, Woodside 
respectfully requests that the decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and the decision 
of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Woodside be affirmed. 
DATED this __j day of September, 2005. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
IL 
. Russell 
Timothy B. Smith 
Attorneys for Appellant/Petitioner 
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Q31U IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALIS. YAZD and PARVIN YOUSEFI, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WOODSIDE HOMES CORPORATION,! 
and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
Case No. 020402197 
Judge Gary D; Stott 
This matter comes before the court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. On 
May 28,2002, Plaintiffs submitted their Complaint alleging four causes of action. On August 14, 
2002, this Court dismissed all claims of breach of warranty and compelled arbitration. The claim 
of mutual mistake was likewise arbitrated. Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment addresses only the remaining claims of fraudulent non-disclosure and fraudulent 
concealment. 
On September 29,2003, a hearing was held to consider the issues raised by Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Prior to the hearing, both parties submitted various memoranda 
of points and authorities in further support of their positions. The Court has considered the 
memoranda filed by the parties, the testimony provided at the hearing, the relevant case law and 
statutory provisions, and being fully advised in the matter, issues the following ruling. 
BACKGROUND 
1. Woodside Homes Corporation (" Woodside") owned land that became known as the 
Panorama Point Subdivision ("Subdivision") located in Lindon, Utah. 
2. In preparation for the construction of the Subdivision, Woodside hired the geotechnical 
engineering firm currently known as Amec Earth & Environmental ("Amec") to conduct 
an investigation of the soils in the subdivision and prepare a report. 
3. Amec's Report indicated that the upper one and one-half to two and one-half feet of soil 
were moisture sensitive and collapsible and recommended the removal of this soil. 
4. On or about March 11, 1995, Plaintiffs entered into a purchase agreement with Woodside 
for the construction of a house on lot 304 of the Subdivision. 
5. Between six to eight feet of soil was removed from lot 304 during the construction of 
Plaintiffs' house. 
6. William Gordon, an engineer at Amec, visited lot 304 during the construction of Plaintiffs' 
house to inspect the soil removal. Mr. Gordon determined that the underlying soils would 
support the house and made recommendations concerning the placement and compaction 
of structural fill. 
7. Woodside understood that the soil excavation on lot 304 had removed all collapsible soils. 
8. Woodside followed the recommendations of Mr. Gordon before laying the foundation of 
Plaintiffs' house. 
9. The Plaintiffs experienced cracking in the foundation of the house and settling of the 
structure. 
10. Soil reports were also performed on land adjacent to the Plaintiffs' lot, including a report 
conducted by Delta Geotechnical Consultants, Inc. This report was conducted on land 
originally owned by the LDS Church, which was later sold to Woodside. 
11. The LDS Church had planned to construct a large single structure that was different from 
the single family homes being constructed by Woodside. 
12. The Delta report indicated the presence of six to sixteen feet of loose to medium density 
silty sand. 
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13, The Delta report did not include an analysis of lot 304, the lot purchased by Plaintiffs. 
14. Woodside was not in possession of the Delta report until after the construction and sale of 
Plaintiffs3 house. 
RULING 
According to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment "shall be rendered 
if the pdeadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." After reviewing the pleadings and listening to 
oral arguments, the Court concludes that no genuine issues of material fact exist. 
The only issue in dispute is what knowledge Woodside had regarding collapsible soils on 
Plaintiffs' lot. The facts demonstrate that (1) prior to construction, Woodside was aware of the 
existence of collapsible soils on Plaintiffs5 lot to a depth of two and one-half feet; (2) between six 
and eight feet of soil was removed during the excavation for Plaintiffs' house; (3) after inspecting 
the, excavation, a soils engineer indicated to Woodside that the underlying soils would support the 
Plaintiffs' house; (4) Woodside followed the recommendations ofthe soils engineer in layingthe 
foundation of Plaintiffs' house; and (5) during construction and after the completion of Plaintiffs' 
house, Woodside understood that all of the collapsible soils had been removed from Plaintiffs' lot, 
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Woodside had any knowledge of remaining collapsible soils 
on Plaintiffs' lot. Therefore, Plaintiffs failed to raise any issue of material fact that would preclude 
entry of summary judgment in favor of Woodside. 
in deciding whether Defendant, Woodside, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the 
Court cqnsiders two arguments brought by the Plaintiffs: (1) whether Woodside's conduct 
constituted fraudulent non-disclosure, and (2) whether Woodside's conduct constituted fraudulent 
concealment. 
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L Fraudulent Non-disclosure 
In order "to support a claim of fraudulent non-disclosure a plaintiff must prove the 
following three elements: (1) the non-disclosed information is material, (2) the non-disclosed 
information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to 
communicate.55 Mitchell v. Christensen. 31 P.3d 572, 574 (Utah 2001). 
It is clear that the continued presence of collapsible soils would be material information. 
Therefore, to decide whether Woodside acted fraudulently, it must be determined if any non-
disclosed information was known to them and whether they had a legal duty to communicate such 
information to the Plaintiffs. Given the undisputed facts, this Court finds that Plaintiffs5 
fraudulent non-disclosure claim against Woodside fails because there were no facts presented to 
show that Woodside knew of remaining collapsible soils on lot 304. In fact, the soil engineer, Mr. 
Gordon, indicated to Woodside that lot 304 was suitable for construction. Because Plaintiffs 
cannot establish that Woodside had knowledge of any such information, it necessarily follows that 
there can be no duty to disclose the information to the Plaintiffs. 
IL Fraudulent Concealment 
Similarly, "[fraudulent concealment requires that one with a legal duty or obligation to 
communicate certain facts remain silent or otherwise act to conceal material facts known to him.55 
McDougalv.Weed. 945 P.2d 175,179 (Utah App. 1997). 
There are no facts to indicate that Woodside remained silent or acted to conceal material 
facts known to them. In fact, Woodside had no knowledge of the possibility of remaining 
collapsible soils on the Plaintiffs' lot Therefore, because material facts were not known to them, 
Woodside had no duty or obligation to communicate any such information and Plaintiffs5 claim of 
fraudulent concealment fails. 
This Court concludes that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that Defendant is 
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Defendant's counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling within twenty (20) 
days of the date of this ruling and submit it for the Court's signature. 
DATED this / 0 day of October, 2003. c**» 
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EST THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AH S. YAZD and PARVW YOUSEFL 
Plaintifife, 
vs. 
WOODSIDE HOMES CORPORATION, 
and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Case No. 020402197 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
Defendant Woodside Home Corp.'s Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs, dated 
August 25,2003, came on for hearing before the Court, the Honorable Gary D. Stott presiding, on 
September 29,2003. Ronald G. Russell and Timothy B. Smith appeared onbehalf ofWoodside, and 
Stephen Quesenberry appeared on behalf of Plaintifis. 
The Court, having reviewed and considered the memoranda, affidavits, and other materials 
submitted by the parties and the materials contained in the file, having heard and considered the 
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arguments of counsel, being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor, hereby 
ORDERS as follows: 
1. Woodside's Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs is GRANTED. 
2. Specifically, the Court finds that: (1) prior to construction of Plaintiffs' house, 
Woodside was aware of the existence of collapsible soils onPlaintiffs' lotto adepthof two and one-
half feet; (2) between six and eigjbt feet of soil was removed during the excavation for Plaintiffs' 
house; (3) afterinspectingthe excavation, asoils engineer indicated to Woodside that the underlying 
soils would support the Plaintiffs' house; (4) Woodside followed the recommendations of the soils 
engineer in laying the foundation of Plaintiffs' house; and (5) during construction and after 
completion of Plaintiffs' house, Woodside understood that all of the collapsible soils had been 
removed from Plaintiffs' lot 
3. Plaintiffs' fraudulent non-disclosure claim fails because there arc no facts that show 
that Woodside knew of remaining collapsible soils on lot 304, Plaintiffs' lot 
4- Plaintiffs' fraudulent concealment claim fails because there are no facts to indicate 
that Woodside remained silent or acted to conceal material facts lenow to Woodside, Woodside had 
no knowledge of remaining collapsible soils on the Plaintiffs' lot 
2 
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ll DATED this _L_i_ day of November, 2003 
APPROVED AS TO FORM this IP 
Honorable Qfafr D. S 
Fourth DistM Court 
.day of October, 2003, 
SteffeetfQuesenbeiTy 
J- Bryaa Qucscnbecry 
Attorneys for Ali Yazd and VA 
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The undersigned hereby certifies that on the \J)_ day of November, 2003, they caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to be delivered to the following: 
Timothy B.Smith 
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless 
185 South State Street, #1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Sent Via: 
Hand -Delivery 
/facsimile 
t / Mailed (postage prepaid) 
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OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20030993-CA 
F I L E D 
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12005 UT App 82 
Fourth District, Provo Department 
The Honorable Gary D. Stott 
Attorneys: J. Bryan Quesenberry and Stephen Quesenberry, Provo, 
for Appellants 
Timothy B. Smith and Ronald G. Russell, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Thorne, 
THORNE, Judge: 
1fl Ali Yazd and Parvin Yousefi (the Buyers) appeal from the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Woodside 
Homes Corporation (Woodside). We reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 In the early 1990s, Woodside began planning and constructing 
a subdivision in Lindon, Utah. The subdivision involved three 
parcels of land, the last of which Woodside purchased from the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day saints (the LDS church) in 
1992 (the LDS parcel). The LDS church had intended to build a 
large church building on the property; however, an engineering 
survey (the Delta report) revealed that the subsurface soil was 
extremely collapsible--a condition that leads to soil compaction 
when water is introduced to the soil--to a depth of at least 
twenty-seven feet. The LDS church, through its sales 
representative, informed Woodside of the less than ideal 
subsurface soil conditions, and according to the sales contract, 
Woodside was to be provided with a copy of the Delta report after 
the sale. 
\3 Prior to purchasing the LDS property, Woodside had performed 
its own examination of the subsurface soil conditions on the 
other two parcels involved in its subdivision. The resulting 
report informed Woodside that subsurface soil in these parcels 
was collapsible to a depth of approximately two feet. In 
response, Woodside added provisions to its plan for the removal 
of topsoil to a depth greater than the average weak soil depth as 
indicated by their engineering survey. After purchasing the LDS 
parcel, Woodside chose not to replicate its engineering survey, 
instead it chose to rely on its existing engineering report1 
without examining the soil on the LDS parcel. Woodside then 
proceeded with its construction plans. 
^4 In 1995, the Buyers entered into a contract with Woodside to 
purchase a lot within the subdivision and to have a house built 
upon the lot. Woodside did not disclose to the Buyers the result 
of either its engineering report or the Deltai report. Thus, the 
Buyers entered into the purchase agreement with no knowledge of 
the subsurface soil deficiencies. The Buyers1 lot was adjacent 
to the LDS parcel and approximately thirty fe^ et from one of the 
test holes drilled during the preparation of the Delta report. 
After closing on the house in September 1995, the Buyers moved 
in. Soon after, beginning in 1996 and extending into 1997, the 
Buyers noticed cracks.in the foundation, the basement floor, and 
the driveway. They also noticed that doors throughout the house 
were no longer square. When they brought these problems to 
Woodside!s attention, Woodside informed them that the cracks, 
etc., were normal and the result of nothing more than natural 
settling. Woodside then patched the cracks and assured the 
Buyers that they had no reason for concern. 
^5 The Buyers were placated by Woodside1s assurances until 
2002, when they put the house up for sale. They soon had a 
potential purchaser, but a prepurchase inspection of the home 
revealed that it sat on a sea of collapsible soil. The engineer 
who performed the inspection, Kenneth Karren, informed the Buyers 
of the extent of the problem, and the Buyers learned, after 
engaging the services of another soil engineer, that it would 
take a great deal of money to repair the house and ensure that 
the poor subsurface soil caused no additional damage. 
^6 Consequently, in April 2002, the Buyers filed suit against 
Woodside. ,The Buyers alleged that Woodside1s failure to disclose 
1. Woodside denies having ever received a copy of the Delta 
report from the LDS church, and thus denies having any knowledge 
of the true depth of the weak soil on or near the LDS parcel. 
o 
the presence of the collapsible soil was a breach of the 
contractual warranty and that it amounted to a fraudulent 
nondisclosure. Pursuant to a motion to compel arbitration, the 
trial court submitted all of the Buyers1 contract claims to 
arbitration. Following the successful completion of arbitration, 
Woodside filed for summary judgment on the Buyers' fraud claims. 
The trial court granted the motion, dismissing the Buyers1 
complaint after concluding that Woodside had neither real, nor 
constructive, knowledge of the contents of the Delta report. The 
Buyers now appeal, 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW2 
^7 The Buyers argue that the trial court's decision to grant 
Woodside's motion for summary judgment was incorrect. * 
2. During the pendency of this appeal, Woodside filed a motion 
to dismiss the appeal as moot, Woodside argued that because the 
Buyers had received an arbitration award equal to their actual 
damages, pursuant to their contract claims, they were precluded 
from seeking any additional damages. In essence, Woodside argues 
that further recovery is barred under the doctrine of election of 
remedies and because the Buyers are not entitled to receive a 
double recovery of damages for their claim. After consideration, 
we conclude that Woodside is incorrect, and the issue is not 
moot. Thus, we deny Woodside's motion. 
Woodside failed to raise in the trial court either its 
election of remedies argument or its double recovery argument. 
"The defense of election of remedies is an affirmative one and 
must be raised by way of answer, motion, or demand so as to put 
the issue before the trial court, and is not to be raised for the 
first time on appeal." Royal Res., Inc, v. Gibralter Fin. Corp., 
603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979) (footnotes omitted). Thus, we do 
not address this argument, and deny Woodside's motion to the 
extent it relies upon this doctrine. 
Moreover, we have previously addressed an argument similar 
to Woodside's concern that any additional recovery awarded to the 
Buyers would amount to a windfall double recovery. In Brown v. 
Richards, among a host of other issues, we addressed whether 
damages awarded for breach of warranty and damages awarded for 
fraud were necessarily duplicative and concluded that they were 
not. See 840 P.2d 143, 152-53 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Central to 
our determination was the nature of these claims and whether any 
grounds existed to conclude that they may not be duplicative. 
See id. Here, the Buyers1 fraud claim asks for damages not 
necessarily duplicative of the breach of warranty damages that 
have already been awarded. Therefore, we are not in a position 
to summarily deny the Buyers additional recovery and instead must 
deny Woodside's motion to dismiss. 
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In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we 
give no deference to the trial court with 
respect to its legal conclusions. Rather, we 
make our own determination as to whether the 
record shows "that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law," 
Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55^6, 94 P. 3d 919 (citations 
omitted). Additionally, we view "'the facts in a light most 
favorable to the losing party below.« M Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002 
UT 21,^7, 44 P.3d 704 (quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 
779 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Utah 1989)). 
ANALYSIS 
%B The Buyers assert that during the purchase of their property 
and the negotiations for the construction of their home, Woods ide 
either fraudulently concealed or fraudulently failed to disclose 
the presence of collapsible soil under and surrounding their 
property. The elements required to satisfy these claims are 
.identical. See Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55,^12, 94 P.3d 919 
(equating the elements of fraudulent concealment with the 
elements of fraudulent nondisclosure discussed in Hermansen v. 
Tasulis, 2002 UT 52,1(24, 48 P.3d 235) . To establish either 
claim, the Buyers "'must prove the following three elements: (1) 
the nondisclosed information is material, (2) the nondisclosed 
information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) 
there is a legal duty to communicate.*'1 Frandsen, 2004 UT 55 at 
Hl2 (quoting Hermansen, 2002 UT 52 at ^24) ; see also Mitchell v. 
Christensen, 2001 UT 80, \3 , 31 P„3d 572, 
^9 There is little question that the information contained in 
the Delta report would have been material to the Buyers in this 
case. See Hermansen, 2002 UT 52 at \1S (defining materiality to 
be "something which a buyer or seller of ordinary intelligence 
and prudence would think to be of some importance in determining 
whether to buy or sell" (emphasis added) (quotations and citation 
omitted)). The Delta report stated that the subsurface soils 
found no more than thirty feet from the Buyers' lot were unstable 
to a depth of nearly thirty feet, and this information was 
central to the LDS church's decision to sell the property, rather 
than build on it. Although the report may not have dealt 
directly with the condition of the soil under the Buyers' lot, we 
cannot say as a matter of law that the information would not have 
been of some interest to the Buyers. See id. Consequently, the 
information in the Delta report is material. 
n-i r*7\ 4 
^10 We can say, however, that if Woodside possessed the Delta 
report, or had knowledge of its content, prior to concluding 
the sale with the Buyers, it had a duty to disclose the 
information to the Buyers. "'The issue of whether a duty exists 
is entirely a question of law to be determined by the court. ,H 
Frandsen, 2004 UT 55 at Hl4 (quoting Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 
149, 151 (Utah 1989)). In Frandsen, the supreme court examined 
the duty that a developer has "to protect unsophisticated 
purchasers." Id. at Hl6. Relying on existing case law, the 
court stated that a developer has 
"a duty to exercise reasonable care to insure 
that the subdivided lots are suitable for 
construction of some type of ordinary, 
average dwelling house, and he must disclose 
to his purchaser any condition which he knows 
or reasonably ought to know makes the 
subdivided lots unsuitable for such 
residential building. He has a further duty 
to disclose, upon inquiry, information he has 
developed in the course of the subdivision 
process which is relevant to the suitability 
of the land for its expected use." 
Id. (quoting Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 769 (Utah 
1J?87)) . Applying this standard, the court found that "the law 
imputes to builders and contractors a high degree of specialized 
knowledge and expertise with regard to residential construction,M 
expertise normally not possessed by unsophisticated purchasers. 
Id. at Hl8. As part of this specialized knowledge, "builder-
contractors are expected to be familiar with conditions in the 
subsurface of the ground," id. at Kl9, and if there is a problem 
with the subsurface soils, the builder is charged with a duty to 
disclose. 
[^11 Woodside argues that through its own efforts it discovered 
and removed a layer of weak subsurface soils that existed 
throughout the subdivision and that, through a subsequent 
engineering inspection, it was assured that no additional 
problems existed in the subsoil. Woodside, however, 
misapprehends the scope of its duty in this circumstance. 
Assuming, as we must for purposes of reviewing a trial court's 
summary judgment decision, that the Buyers are correct and that 
Woodside was provided with the Delta report prior to the sale to 
the Buyers, then our focus is properly upon the Delta report and 
whether it would have been material to the Buyers1 decision to 
purchase. Having determined that the report would have been 
material, as it contained information that would have been of 
some interest to the Buyers in making their decision to buy, see 
Hermansen, 2002 UT 52 at ^29, we conclude that Woodside had a 
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duty to disclose the report, or its contents, if Woodside 
received the report prior to the sale to the Buyers. 
^12 Finally, and most importantly to this case, we address the 
knowledge element.3 We note first that 
summary judgment is almost never appropriate 
in a fraudulent concealment case, except "(i) 
when the facts are so clear that reasonable 
persons could not disagree about the 
underlying facts or about the application of 
the governing legal standards to the facts or 
(ii) when the facts underlying the allegation 
of fraudulent concealment are so tenuous, 
vague, or insufficiently established that 
they fail to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact as to concealment, with the 
result that the claim fails as a maitter of 
law." 
McDoucral v. Weed, 945 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting 
Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 54 (Utah 1996)). 
1(13 In support of their claim that Woodside knew of, or was in 
possession of, the Delta report, the Buyers submitted a host of 
materials attached to their opposition to Woodsidefs summary 
judgment motion. Included among these materials was a copy of 
the purchase agreement between Woodside and the LDS church for 
the LDS parcel. Contained in that contract is a promise that the 
LDS church would supply Woodside with "a copy of the soils report 
previously completed on the project," i.e., the Delta report. 
The opposition also contained the deposition testimonies of 
Kenneth Karren and Blaine Livingston. Karren, an engineer hired 
to inspect the Buyers' home during their attempt to sell the 
property, testified that to the best of his recollection Woodside 
had received the Delta report and that he had been given portions 
of the report while he was investigating the damage to another 
house in the same neighborhood in 1996. Livingston, who was the 
LDS church's real estate sales representative for the sale of the 
LDS parcel, testified that prior to the sale he had informed 
Woodside of the existence of the Delta report and that the 
parcel's subsurface soil condition was less than ideal. 
3. The sole basis for the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment was its conclusion that Woodside dxd not know of the 
Delta report prior to selling the property to the Buyers. The 
trial court assumed that the presence of collapsible soil on the 
adjacent lot was material and, for purposes of the motion, 
Woodside did not dispute its duty to disclose. 
^14 In contrast, Woodside denies ever receiving a copy of the 
Delta report, and claims that although it was informed of the 
presence of collapsible soil on the parcel, it was not made aware 
of the scope of the problem. However, when faced with a summary 
judgment issue, we are compelled to draw the facts and inferences 
in the favor of the nonmovingr panty—in this case the Buyers--and 
after doing so, we conclude that sufficient disputed material 
facts exist to create a genuine issue for trial. See Hermansen, 
2002 UT 52 at f31. 
CONCLUSION 
1(15 The Delta report contained information that likely bore on 
the stability of the land upon which the Buyers1 home was built. 
If Woodside was privy to the information contained in the report 
prior to selling the property and building the Buyers1 home, 
Woodside had a duty to disclose this information. Thus, the 
question of whether Woodside received the Delta report is 
material to the Buyers' allegations of fraudulent concealment and 
nondisclosure. Because the Buyers presented sufficient evidence 
to support their claim that Woodside received the report prior to 
the sale, summary judgment was improperly granted. 
^16 Accordingly, we reverse the trial court1s grant of 
Woodside1s motion for summary judgment and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
•sf. 7 
William A. Thorne Jr udge 
\\1 WE CONCUR: 
JGtlith M. Billings, J 
Presiding Judge 
/ . 
amela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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James Ashley FENNELL II, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
FENNELL v. GREEN Utah 339 
Cite as 77 P.3d 339 (UtahApp. 2003) 
defendants' statements of uncontroverted 
facts, but instead only included his own state-
ment of undisputed facts. Judicial Adminis-
tration Rule 4-501(2X6) (2000). 
Edward D. GREEN; Neil Wall aka Neil J. 
Wall; and GMW Development, Inc. dba 
Ivory North, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 20011029-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Aug. 21, 2003. 
Homeowner sued builder and developers 
for intentional failure to disclose, negligent 
failure to disclose, and breach of implied 
warranty, following landslide on his lot The 
District Court, Second District, Layton De-
partbent, Thomas L. Kay, J., granted1 defen-
dants summary judgment, and homeowner 
appealed The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, 
J., held that: (1) trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that homeowner admit-
ted the undisputed facts alleged by defen-
dants; (2) defendants did not know that lot 
home was built on contained a landslide area, 
for purposes of homeowner's fraudulent non-
disclosure and negligent misrepresentation 
claims; (3) economic loss rule prevented 
homeowner from claiming damages for loss 
in the value of his lot under his negligent 
misrepresentation claim; and (4) the implied 
warranty of habitability has not been extend-
ed to purchasers of residential property. 
Affirmed. 
1. Motions <2 l^ 
The trial court has discretion in requir-
ing compliance with Judicial Administration 
Rule setting forth uniform procedures for 
motions and supporting memoranda Judi-
cial Administration Rule 4-501(2)(B) (2000). 
2. Judgment <£=>183 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
requiring compliance with rule regarding 
memoranda submitted in opposition to mo-
tions for summary judgment, and thus ruling 
that facts stated by defendants in their mo-
tion as uncontroverted were admitted, where 
plaintiff in his response did not refer to 
3. Fraud <S=>16 
To support a claim of fraudulent nondis-
closure a plaintiff must prove the following 
three elements: (1) the nondisclosed informa-
tion is material; (2) the nondisclosed informa-
tion is known to the party failing to disclose; 
and (3) there is a legal duty to communicate. 
4. Fraud =^^ 16 
Developers did not know that lot home 
was built on contained a landslide area, for 
purposes of homeowner's fraudulent nondis-
closure claim against developers, where per-
son who conducted soil testing on behalf of 
developers concluded that though there was 
an undercut by a creek there was not a slide 
area on the lot. 
5. Fraud <s=>25, 32 
Economic loss rule prevented home-
owner, under his claim of negligent misrepre-
sentation against developers, from claiming 
damages due to a decrease in the value of his 
lot as a result of a landslide, as homeowner 
bought property from building contractor 
and did not have a contractual relationship 
with developers, homeowner could not im-
pose his economic expectations on non-con-
tracting parties, and damaged property was 
part of the "package" homeowner contracted 
for with building contractor. 
6. Negligence <$=>463 
The economic loss rule prevents a party 
from claiming economic damages in negli-
gence absent physical property damage or 
bodily injury. 
7. Products Liability <£=>17.1 
"Economic loss," for purposes of the eco-
nomic loss rule which prevents a party from 
claim such losses in negligence absent physi-
cal property damage or bodily injury, is de-
fined as damages for inadequate value, costs 
of repair and replacement of the defective 
product, or consequential loss of profits as 
well as the diminution in the value of the 
product because it is inferior in quality and 
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does not work for the general purposes for 
which it was manufactured and sold. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
8. Contracts <^205.35{1) 
A cause of action for breach of an im-
plied warranty of habitability does not extend 
to purchasers of residential property. 
9. Fraud <S 1^3(3) 
An effective claim for negligent misrep-
resentation requires that the party making 
the misrepresentation was in a superior posi-
tion to know of the material fact 
10. Fraud <^13(3), 16 
Home builder did not have any knowl-
edge of landslide condition on lot that it was 
required to disclose to homeowner, for pur-
poses of homeowner's fraudulent nondisclo-
sure and negligent misrepresentation claims 
against home builder, where person who con-
ducted soil testing on behalf of developers 
concluded that though there was an undercut 
by a creek there was not a slide area on the 
lot, and homeowner admitted in his complaint 
that developers did not disclose to home 
builder that there was a geological hazard on 
the lot 
11. Contracts <&=>205.35(2,4) 
Homeowner did not have a cause of ac-
tion for breach of an implied warranty of 
habitability against home builder due to land-
slide that occurred on his lot, as such a cause 
of action did not extend to purchasers of 
residential property, and builder specifically 
excluded the claim contractually in home-
owner's contract for the purchase of the lot. 
Lavar E. Stark and Frank M. Wells, Og-
den, for Appellant. 
Paul M. Belnap, Andrew D. Wright, Byron 
G. Martin, Strong & Hanni, Brandon B. 
Hobbs, Christian S. Collins, Elizabeth A. 
Hruby-Mills, Richards Brandt Miller & Nel-
son, Barbara K. Berrett, and Kumen L. Tay-
lor, Berrett & Associates LC, Salt Lake City; 
and David R. Hamilton, Smith Knowles & 
Hamilton, PC, Ogden, for Appellees. 
Before JACKSON, P J , and BILLINGS, 
Associate P J.f and GREENWOOD, J. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
H 1 James Ashley Fennell II appeals the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of defendants Edward D. Green, Neil 
Wall, and GMW Development, Inc., dba Ivo-
ry North (Ivory North) (collectively, Defen 
dants). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
12 Green and Wall were partners in devel-
opment of the Falcon Ridge Subdivision (the 
Subdivision) in Layton, Utah, which included 
lot 31. Layton City required a soils report 
to be conducted on the Subdivision prior to 
its development Green and Wall hired 
Glenn R. Maughan to conduct the required 
soils report The soils report was completed 
October 7, 1992, with additional testing com-
pleted on lot 31 and reported on October 9, 
1992. Maughan's October 9 soils report stat-
ed that a scarp existed "on the north 20 feet 
of Lot # [31V which was determined to be a 
landfall. Maughan recommended that "the 
road right-of-way to Beech Adams be placed 
along the inside of the fence .. [which] 
would reduce the slope to Kays Creek 
[and that] a 45-degree angle would be suffi-
cient . . . [but that] a 15-degree safety factor 
is recommended." Maughan's report was 
filed with Layton City and available for pub-
lic inspection. Bill Flanders, the Layton 
City engineer, reviewed the soils report and 
determined that Green and Wall had "com-
plied with all of the necessary regulations 
and standards to gain approval from Layton 
City for the Falcon Ridge Subdivision/' 
Subsequently, Layton City approved the 
Subdivision for residential building. 
H 3 [vory North is a real estate developer. 
Fennell expressed interest in [vory North 
constructing a home for him on lot 31. On 
May 18, 1995, Fennell entered into an agree-
ment with Ivory North for the purchase of a 
home to be built on lot 31 of the Subdivision. 
Pursuant to the agreement, Ivory North pur-
chased lot 31 from Wall and Green. Fennell 
had no contact with Wall and Green. Ivory 
FENNELL v. GREEN 
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North then built a home on lot 31 and trans-
ferred title to Fennel! on December 22, 1995. 
In April 1998, a landslide occurred on lot 31. 
No one was injured and the only damage was 
to landscaping.1 However, Fennell claims 
, faQ value of lot 31 greatly decreased because 
of the landslide. 
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ANALYSIS 
I. Rule 4-50K2XB) 
14 On April 7, 2000, Fennell filed a com-
plaint against Green, Wall, and Ivory North 
alleging intentional failure to disclose, negli-
gent failure to disclose, and breach of an 
implied warranty. All Defendants filed mo-
tions for summary judgment After a hear-
ing, the trial court granted Defendants' mo-
tions for summary judgment based on (1) 
Fennell's failure to comply with rule 4-
50K2XB1) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Ad-
ministration by not specifically controverting 
the facts as set forth by Defendants in the 
memoranda in support of their motions for 
summary judgment, (2) Fennell's failure to 
establish that any of the Defendants knew lot 
31 was susceptible to landslides, (3) the eco-
nomic loss rule, and (4) Utah's refusal to 
recognize implied warranties for residential 
property. 
K 5 This appeal followed. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
16 Fennell appeals, claiming the trial 
court erred in granting Defendants' motions 
for summary judgment "Summary judg-
ment is granted only when 'there is no genu-
ine issue as to any material fact' and the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law/," Bearden v. Croft, 2001 UT 
76,15, 31 P.3d 537 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c)) "In reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment, [this court! gives 'no deference 
to the trial court's conclusions of law: those 
conclusions are reviewed for correctness.'" 
M (quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield v 
State, 779 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Utah 1989)). 
1. However, in his motion in opposition to sum 
mary judgment, Fennell alleges that there was 
also damage to a wall 
2 The trial court noted its frustration with Fen 
nell's repl) memoranda to Defendants' motions 
H 7 Fennell appeals the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of Defendants 
based on his failure to comply with rule 4-
601(2X8) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Ad-
ministration. At the time the motions for 
summary judgment were filed, rule 4-
501(2)(B) stated: 
The points and authorities in opposition to 
a motion for summary judgment shall be-
gin with a section thai contains a concise 
statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists 
Each disputed fact shall be stated in sepa-
rate numbered sentences and shall specifi-
cally refer to those portions of the record 
upon which the opposing party relies and, 
if applicable, shall state the numbered sen-
tence or sentences of the movant's facts 
that are disputed. All material facts set 
forth in the movant's statement and prop-
erly supported by an accurate reference to 
the record shall be deemed admitted for 
the purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the opposing 
party's statement 
Utah R. JuA Admin. 4-501(2)(B) (amended 
November 2001) (emphasis added). It is 
clear that Fennell failed to comply with the 
rule. He did not refer to Defendants' state-
ments of uncontroverted facts, but instead 
included only his own statement of undisput-
ed facts. As a result, it was unclear what 
facts Fennell contended were disputed.2 
However, Fennell argues that the trial court 
violated his substantive rights and abused its 
discretion when it required compliance with 
rule 4 501. Fennell cites Scott u Majors, 
1999 UT App 139,1112, 980 P.2d 214, as sup-
port for this contention. In Scott, this court 
stated that the Utah Rules of Judicial Ad-
ministration "are not intended to, nor do 
they, create or modify substantive rights of 
litigants, nor do they decrease the inherent 
for summary judgment The court asked why 
Fennell's counsel failed to follow rule 4-501 m 
"responding to the summary judgment 7" Fen-
nell's counsel admitted that he may have been 
"deficient ' in following rule 4-501 
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power of the court to control matters pend-
ing before it." Id. 
V8 The Utah Supreme Court, however, 
recently emphasized the importance of 
compliance with the Rules of Judicial Ad-
ministration in Lovendahl u Jordan School 
District, 2002 UT 130, 63 P.3d 705.3 In Lo-
vendahl, the plaintiff sued for damages un-
der a claim for inverse condemnation. See 
id. at H48. The defendant's summary 
judgment motion and supporting memoran-
dum included facts and arguments that the 
plaintiff, in opposing the summary judg-
ment motion, did not address. See id. at 
^50. The court noted that under rule 4-
501(2)(B) "all facts set forth in the mov-
ant's statement of facts are 'deemed admit-
ted for the purpose of summary judgment 
unless specifically controverted by the op-
posing party's statement'" Lovendahl, 
2002 UT 130 at 150, 63 PM 705 (quoting 
Utah R Jud. Admin. 4-501(2XB)). Be« 
cause the plaintiff did not specifically con-
trovert the facts outlined in the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment, the court 
rejected the plaintiffs claim that there was 
insufficient evidence to support summary 
judgment See id. 
[1,2] H 9 In addition, the trial court has 
discretion in requiring compliance with rule 
4-501. See Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 
888 P.2d 694, 701-02 (Utah CtApp.1994) (up^ 
holding trial court's exercise of discretion in 
refusing to accept supplemental memoranda 
outside bounds of rule 4-601). Utah courts 
have repeatedly upheld the necessity of com-
pliance with the Utah Rules of Judicial Ad-
ministration. See id.; see also Golding v, 
Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co., 902 P2d 142, 
148 (Utah 1995) (determining that failure to 
comply with rule 4-501 made additional fil-
ings moot); cf. Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 
1251, 1255 (Utah 1997) (finding trial court 
erred in not complying with rule 4-501 but 
affirming because error was harmless); Lo-
porto v. Hoegemann, 1999 UT App 175,1114, 
3. Lovendahl v Jordan School District, 2002 UT 
130, 63 P 3d 705, is a plurality opinion with the 
Utah Supreme Court split on one issue Howev-
er, the section instructive as to this matter re 
ceived majority support See id. at % 3 
982 P.2d 586 (reversing trial court where it 
did not follow notice requirement of rule 4^  
506 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administra-
tion). See generally Parker u Dodgion, 971 
P.2d 4%, 497 n. 3 (Utah 1998) (affirming trial 
court on other grounds but noting plaintiffs 
response to motion for summary judgment 
failed to conform with rule 4-501 because it 
failed to set forth disputed facts and did not 
contain numbered sentences). These cases 
establish that a trial court may exercise its 
discretion to require compliance with the 
Rules of Judicial Administration, particularly 
rule 4-501, without impairing a party's sub-
stantive rights. In this case, we do not 
believe the court abused its discretion in 
requiring compliance with rule 4-501 and 
thus ruling that the facts, as stated in Defers 
damts' motions and supporting memoranda, 
were deemed admitted. We rely on those 
adrrutted facts in addressing the remaining 
issues raised by FennelL 
II. Summary Judgment as 
to Green and Wall 
A. Fraudulent Nondisclosure 
[J] fllO Fennell argues that the trial 
court erred in granting WalFs and Green's 
motions for summary judgment as to Fen-
neiTs claim of fraudulent nondisclosure.4 
"To support a claim of fraudulent nondisclo-
sure a plaintiff must prove the following 
three elements: (1) the nondisciosed infor-
mation is material, (2) the nondisciosed in-
formation is known to the party failing to 
disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to com-
municate." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 
52,124, 48 P.3d 235. Defendants do not 
arjjue that the possibility of landslides on lot 
31 is not material information. Therefore, to 
decide whether Wall and Green acted fraud-
ulently, it must be determined if any nondis-
ciosed information was known to them and 
whether they had a legal duty to communi-
cate the information to Fennell. See id. 
4. Initially Fennel! claimed damages under a 
claim of intentional nondisclosure However, 
there is no such cause of action in Utah The trial 
court interpreted Fennell's claim as one of fraud 
uient nondisclosure, and Fennell does not appeal 
this interpretation 
FENNELL v. GREEN 
Cite as 77 P 3d 339 (Utah App. 2003) 
Utah 343 
** H 11 Given the uncontroverted facts, we 
determine that Fennell's fraudulent nondis-
closure claim against Wall and Green fails 
because there were no facts presented to 
show that Wall or Green knew of a possible 
landslide condition on lot 31. Indeed, such 
knowledge was refuted by Maughan, who 
conducted the required soils report of, lot 31 
and stated in his deposition5 that he did not 
believe that lot 31 was a landslide area: 
Q. O.K. My question is: Was the area on 
the fl&t surface of [lot 31] stable as op 
posed to the- bank itself where the stream 
had undercut it? 
A. It was stable at that point, yes. 
Q. And .you felt there was not a slide in 
that area, that [the] stream had simply 
undercut it? 
A. That's right But to protect it we put 
the slope back so they—4,0 allow for future 
sloughing. 
Q.« Okay. So when you finished up your 
analysis of this subdivision, you did not 
believe this area was a slide area in any of 
the lots, and that the only area where there 
had been some movement was on lot [SI], 
and thaVs because the stream had under-
cut the bank down below? 
A. That's right 
Q. Is that a fair statement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that's what youVe told us a few 
minutes ago in my question, that you found 
that area stable with only the exception of 
where the creek had undercut down by the 
bank below lot [31]? 
A Yes. 
Q. And from that observation and opinion 
that youVe made, you determined that this 
was not a slide area but just an undercut 
by the creek, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So my question is If you had some 
~ data or an opinion that this was a land-
slide area, you certainly would have put 
5. This deposition excerpt was referred to by Wall 
and Green as support tor their statements of 
undisputed facts 
that in your report and told somebody 
ahoui it; is thai true? 
A. That's true. 
Furthermore, Bill Flanders, engineer for 
Layton City, stated in his affidavit6 that 
after reviewing the Subdivision plans for 
compliance, he required Wall and Green to 
obtain a soils study for the Subdivision. Af-
ter reviewing Maughan's soils report Flan-
ders determined that Wall and Green "com-
plied with all necessary regulations and 
standards to gain approval from Layton City 
for the Falcon Ridge Subdivision/1 
[4] f 12 Because Fennell cannot establish 
that Wall and Green had knowledge of any 
such information, it necessarily follows that 
there can be no duty to disclose the informa-
tion to either Ivory North or Fennell. 
B. Economic Loss Rule & Negligent 
Misrepresentation 
[5-7] H 13 We also determine that the 
trial court was correct in determining that 
the economic loss rule prevents Fennell from 
claiming economic damages under a claim of 
negligent misrepresentation. The economic 
loss rule prevents a party from claiming eco-
nomic damages " in negligence absent physi-
cal property damage or bodily injury/" 
SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, 
Stainback & Assoc, Inc., 2001 UT 54,1132, 28 
P.3d 669 (citation omitted). Economic loss is 
defined as 
"[djamages for inadequate value, costs of 
repair and replacement of the defective 
product, or consequential loss of profits 
without any claim of personal injury or 
damage to other property .. as well as 
'the diminution in the value of the product 
because it is inferior in quality and does 
not work for the general purposes for 
which it was manufactured and sold/ " 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting American 
Towers Owners Ass% Inc. v. CCI Mech, 
Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Utah 1996) (quot-
ing Maack v. Resource Design & Constr, 
IVJC., 875 P.2d 570, 579^80 (Utah CtApp. 
1994))). 
6. Flanders's affidavit also supported Wall's and 
Green's statements of undisputed facts 
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H 14 The economic loss rule was applied in 
American Towers where condominium home-
owners brought suit against contractors for 
faulty construction in the plumbing and me-
chanical systems. See 930 P.2d at 1184 
The homeowners were not parties to any of 
the construction contracts and had no en-
forceable rights as special beneficiaries See 
id. at 1187. The court barred the home-
owners from collecting for losses under the 
economic loss theory, determining that any 
other holding would "impose the [home-
owners'] economic expectations upon parties 
whom the [homeowners] did not know and 
with whom they did not deal and upon con-
tracts to which they were not a party." Id. 
at 1192. 
H15 As in American Towers, FennelTs 
claim for recovery for negligent nondisclo-
sure is barred by the economic loss rule 
because "economic damages are not recover-
able in negligence absent physical property 
damage or bodily injury."7 Id. at 1189. 
Similar to the homeowners in American 
Towers, Fennell did not have a contractual 
relationship with Wall and Green; thus, the 
economic loss rule applies to prevent the 
imposition of "economic expectations" on 
non-contracting parties. Id. at 1192 There-
fore, the trial court was correct in granting 
Wall's and Green's motions for summary 
judgment as to Fennell's claim of negligent 
misrepresentation8 
C, Breach of Implied Warranty 
[8] H 16 Fennell also appeals the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Wall and 
7. Two recent Utah Supreme Court cases have 
interpreted the economic loss rule However, 
they are not applicable here and can be distm 
guished Grynberg v Questar Pipeline Co , 2003 
UT 8, 70 P 3d 1, interprets Wyoming law and its 
economic loss rule See id, at UH 39, 40-44 (de-
termining that Wyoming had adopted the eco 
nomic loss rule) Hermansen v Tasulis, 2002 UT 
52, 48 P 3d 235, involves a suit brought by pur 
chasers against their real estate agent regarding 
knowledge of land stability See id at Wf3, 5 
This case can be disUnguished from the claim 
against Wall and Green because in Hermansen 
the defendants had an independent duty to plain 
tiffs as real estate professionals See id at H 23 
8 Fennell argues that the economic loss doctrine 
does not apply to Wall and Green because the 
"injury or damage [was] to other property" 
Fennell's argument fails because in American 
Green on Fennell's breach of implied warrai^ 
ty claim- However, Utah does not recognize 
a cause cf action for breach of an implied 
warranty of habitability for residential prop, 
erty. As stated in American Towers Owner* 
Ass% Inc. v CCI Mechanical Inc, 930 Pj>d 
1182 (Ufcih 1996), a breach of an implied 
warranty of habitability has not been extend-
ed to purcliasers of residential property. See 
id. at 1193-94, The policy for refusing such 
a claim was explained by the supreme court 
The purchaser has the right to inspect the 
house before the purchase as thoroughly 
as that individual desires, and to condition 
purchase of the house upon a satisfactory 
inspection report. Further, if there are 
particular concerns about a home, the par-
ties can contract for an express written 
warranty from the seller. Finally, if there 
are material latent defects of which the 
seller was aware, the buyer may have a 
cause of action in fraud. Therefore, the 
circumstances presented to the purchaser 
of a residence are not closely analogous to 
those of a relatively powerless lessee 
Id. at L193 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Maack v Resource Design & Constr, Inc., 
875 P.2d 570, 582-33 (Utah CtApp.1994)); 
see also Snow Flower Homeowners Ass'n v 
Snow Fhrwer, Ltd., 2001 UT App 207,t 30, 31 
P.3d 576 (following American Towers holding 
that "Utah does not recognize a claim for a 
breach of the implied warranty of habitability 
in the context of purchasers of residential 
property")- Consequently, the trial court 
Towers Owners Ass'n, Inc v CCI Mech , Inc. 930 
P 2d 1182 (Utah 1996) the Utah Supreme Court 
defined "other property" in construction projects 
as including parts such as " land, design ser 
vices, and construction of a dwelling,'" deter-
mining that the failure of one part, even if it 
causes " 'a diminution of the value of the 
whole,' " is " 'purely economic loss ' " ^ at 
1191 (quoting Sensenbrenner v Rust, Orling & 
Neale, Architects, Inc, 236 Va 419, 374 S E 2d 
55, 58 (1988) (upholding summary judgment for 
architect and pool designer who had no contract 
with buyer, where pool was built on unsettled 
ground which caused broken pipes and broken 
foundation)) Therefore, where the damaged 
property, the land, was part of the "package" 
Fennell contracted for, he cannot argue it is 
"other property" for the purpose of establishing 
an exception to the economic loss rule 
FENNELL v. GREEN 
Cite as 77 P 3d 339 (UtahApp 2003) 
Utah 345 
rrectly granted summary judgment as to 
penneWs breach of warranty da\«v 
III Summary Judgment for Ivory North 
j ^ Fraudulent Nondisclosure & Negli-
gent Misrepresentation 
(9 10] H 17 As stated above, "[t]o support 
claim of fraudulent nondisclosure a plaintiff 
must prove the following three elements (1) 
the nondisclosed information is material, (2) 
the nondisclosed information is known to the 
party failing to disclose, and (3) there is a 
leeal duty to communicate " Hermansen V 
Tasidis, 2002 UT 52,11 24, 48 P 3d 235 Simi-
larly, an effective claim for negligent misrep 
resentation requires that the party making 
the misrepresentation was in a superior posi 
tion to know of the material fact See Price-
Orem Invest Co v Rollins, Brawn & Gun 
nell Inc, t l 3 P2d 55, 59 (Utah 1986) As 
with Wall and Green, the tnal court was 
correct in granting Ivory North's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, as the undisputed facts 
establish that Ivory North had no knowledge 
that lot 31 was subject to landslides There 
are no facts presented that Ivory North was 
told of a landslide condition by either Wall or 
Green, or that Ivory North determined, or 
should have determined, that fact for itself 
Furthermore, Fennell admits in his corn 
plaint that Ivory North did not know about 
the landslide conditions of lot 31, stating 
27 Defendant Green and Wall partner 
ship did not disclose to potential purchas 
ers of the lot the geologist reports and 
geological hazards of Lot 31 on the Subdi 
vision Plat 
28 Defendant Gteen and Wall partner-
ship d\d wot dractos^ to potowtral purcbas 
ers of the lot the geologist reports and 
geological hazards of Lot 31 in the protec 
tive covenants 
29 Defendant Green and Wall partner 
ship did not disclose geological hazards of 
Lot 31 in the contract of sale to Defendant 
[Ivory North! 
30 Defendant Green and Wall partner-
ship did not disclose geological hazards of 
Lot 31 in the deed of conveyance to [Ivory 
N|0rth] 
Because Fennell cannot establish that Ivor} 
North had any knowledge it was required to 
disclose the trial court correctly granted 
summary judgoxeat in favor of Ivory North, 
on this claim 
B. Breach of Implied Warranty 
[11] % 18 Fennell had a contract with Ivo-
ry North for the purchase of lot 31 Howev-
er, Fennell failed to contract with Ivory 
North for a warranty against future land-
slides. Furthermore, the Heal Estate Pur-
chase Contract between Ivory North and 
Fennell expressly excludes any implied war-
ranties: 
Except for the [IVORY NORTH] WAR-
RANTY ahd SELLER'S obligation to re-
pair or replace WALK-THROUGH 
ITEMS: (a) SELLER conveys the PROP-
ERTY to BUYER, "AS IS, WHERE IS," 
WITHOUT REPRESENTATION OR 
WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, 
INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF MER-
CHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A 
PARTICULAR PURPOSE, HABITABIL 
ITYOR WORKMANSHIP, (b) SELLER 
makes no representations or warranties to 
BUYER regarding the environmental 
condition of the PROPERTY (including 
the presence or freedom from radon, haz-
ardous waste or hazardous materials); (c) 
SELLER expressly disclaims any other 
representations or warranties regarding 
the PROPERTY; (d) BUYER accepts the 
PROPERTY in the condition m which the 
PROPERTY exists on the CLOSING 
DATE 
In a similar case, Tibbitts v Openshaw, 18 
Utah 2d 442, 425 P^d 160 (1967), the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the tnal court's dis-
missal ol an implied warranty c\aim where 
the purchase agreement between the two 
parties specifically excluded the claim See 
id at 161-62 Because an implied warranty 
of habitabdity is not extended to purchasers 
of residential property, and Ivory North spe-
cifically excluded the claim contractually, the 
trial court did not err in granting summary 
judgment as to this claim 
CONCLUSION 
119 First, Fennell failed, as required by 
rule 4-£01(2)(R) of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration, to specifically controvert De 
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fendants' statements of undisputed facts and 
clearly identify undisputed facts in his reply 
memoranda to Defendants1 motions for sum-
mary judgment Therefore, the trial court 
did not exceed its discretion in determining 
that the facts as presented in Defendants' 
motions for summary judgment and supple-
mental memoranda were deemed admitted. 
% 20 Second, the trial court properly grant-
ed summary judgment as to FenneiTs claims 
against Wall and Green because (1) the un-
disputed facts establish that Wall and Green 
had no knowledge of potential landslide con-
ditions on lot 31 that would impose a duty to 
disclose, (2) the economic loss rule is applica-
ble and bars recovery for negligent misrepre-
sentation, and (3) Utah law does not provide 
implied warranties for residential property. 
H 21 Finally, the trial court properly grant-
ed summary judgment on Fennell's claims 
agaiqst Ivory North because (1) the undi$~ 
puted facts established that Ivory North had 
no knowledge of potential landslide condi-
tions, and (2) Fennell's contract with Ivory 
North expressly waived any implied warrati-
tfcis, including any warranty for the geologic 
cal condition of lot 31. 
K 22 Affirmed. 
1 23 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. 
JACKSON, Presiding Judge, and JUDITH 
M BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judg^ 
(Q f KIYHUMBC* SYSTEM > 
Addendum E 
SMITH v. FRANDSEN 
Cite as 94 P 3d 919 (Utah 2004) 
Utah 919 
|imply stated, despite the phrasing of the 
Lmplawt, Dowhng's purported injuries "re 
A tie] to or aris[e] out o f treatment rendered 
'-L Bullen to Hoagland, not treatment ren 
meed by Bullen to her Therefore, we hold 
Sat Hoagland, not Dovvlmg, is the '4com 
Plaining patient" whose cause of action, if 
any, IS s u bj e c t to the UHCMA's two year 
statute of limitations This interpretation 
dovetails with both the plain language and 
tuiderlymg purpose of the Act, and does not 
foreclose the possibility that alienation of af-
fections claims may still be encompassed 
within the UHCMA For examplef had the 
alleged malpractice occurred during joint 
therapy sessions in which Bullen furnished 
counseling services to Dowhng and Hoag-
land, the Act would almost certainly apply 
However, that circumstance is not present 
here 
K 14 Finally, Bullen contends in the alter-
native that the court of appeals' decision 
directly conflicts with Jensen v IHC Hospi 
tah Inc, 944 P 2d 327 (Utah 1997) Specifi 
cally, she asserts that Jensen, which involved 
a wrongful death claim, stands for the propo 
sition that all derivative medical malpractice 
actions are governed by the UHCMA's two 
year statute of limitations As such, Bullen 
concludes that, even if Dowhng does not 
qualify as a "complaining patient," her alien-
ation of affections suit is still baned because 
it is a derivative claim stemming from the 
negligent provision of health care services to 
Hoagland Even if Dowhng's claim could be 
characterized as a derivative malpractice 
claim, Bullen misreads Jensen Rather than 
establishing a unifoim rule foi all derivative 
malpractice actions, this court in Jensen held 
that, because u[t]he majority of states te 
fuse[ ] to allow a decedent's hens to proceed 
with a wrongful death suit after the decedent 
has settled his or her personal injury case or 
won or lost a judgment before dying," the 
"applicable statute of limitations is section 
78-14-4 of the [Act][ ] and begins to run 
at the time the patient discovers or 
should have discovered the injury " 944 
P 2d at 332 In short, Jensen addresses the 
statute of limitations question solely in the 
wrongful death context, and we decline to 
adopt Bulien's suggestion that we expand its 
holding to include all derivative medical mal-
practice claims. 
CONCLUSION 
% 15 We affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the case to the district 
court. Based on the plain language of sec-
tions 78-14-3(10) and 78-14-3(15), we hold 
that, in order for the UHCMA's two-year 
statute of limitations to apply, the alleged 
malpractice must "relat[e] to or aris[e] out 
of' health care rendered "for, to, or on behalf 
of a patient during the patient's medical care, 
treatment, or confinement" Here, the basis 
for Dowling's alienation of affections action is 
Bulien's conduct during treatment provided 
by Bullen to Hoagland, not an alleged defi-
ciency in the treatment received by Dowling 
Therefore, Dowling \s not a "complaining pa-
tient" and section 78-14-4(1) does not con-
trol Affirmed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
f 16 Chief Justice DURHAM, Justice 
DURRANT, Justice PARRISH, and Justice 
NEHRING concur in Associate Chief Justice 
WILKINS' opinion, 
( o f K£YNUM8£RSYSTEM > 
2004 UT 55 
Steve and Catherine SMITH, Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. 
Mel FRANDSEN dba Mary Mel 
Construction Co., Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. 20020248. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 2, 2004. 
Background: Home owners brought 
action against subdivider, residential de-
veloper, contractor, and contractor's 
employee for damages for negligent 
misrepresentation, negligence, and 
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fraudulent concealment after the foot-
ings, foundation, and structure of their 
home settled, allegedly due to improper 
soil compaction and a general lack of 
lateral support. The Fourth District, 
Provo, Fred D. Howard, J., granted 
subdivided motion for summary judg-
ment Home owners appealed. 
Holding: The Supreme Court, Durham, 
CJ., held that subdivider's duty of care 
only extended to developer and contractor, 
which should have discovered alleged de-
fect in property. 
Affirmed. 
Wil&ins, A.C.J., concurred in the result with 
opinion in which Durrant, J., concurred. 
L Appeal and Error <3^842(2), 863 
In reviewing a grant of summary judg-
ment, the Supreme Court gives no deference 
to the trial court with respect to its legal 
conclusions; rather, it makes its own determi-
nation as to whether the record shows that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. Rules Civ. 
Proa, Rule 56(c). 
2. Appeal and Error e=>852, 856(1) 
The Supreme Court may affirm the re-
sult reached by the trial court ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment if it is sustain-
able on any legal ground or theory apparent 
on the record, even though that ground or 
theory was not identified by the lower court 
as the basis of its ruling Rules Civ.Proc^ 
Rule 56(c). 
3. Appeal and Error <3=>611, 934(1) 
Home owners* failure to include copy of 
the summary judgment hearing transcript on 
appeal of summary judgment entered against 
them did not require Supreme Court to af-
firm summary judgment ruling under pre-
sumption that trial court ruling was correct, 
as there was no claim that missing transcript 
contained evidence bearing on the determina-
tion of the case. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c); 
Rules App.Proc, Rule 11(e)(2). 
4 Fraud <3=>13(3), 17 
Negligence <£=*210 » 
In order to prevail under the causes of 1 
action of negligent misrepresentation, neglj, 1 
gence, and fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff I 
must demonstrate the existence of a duty 1 
running between the parties. % 
i 
5. Fraud <S=>13(3) \ 
Ordinarily, in order to prevail in an ac- I 
tion for negligent misrepresentation, plain, i 
tiffs must identify a representor who makes \ 
an affirmative assertion which is false, i 
I 
6. F r a u d s 13(3), 17 J 
A duty to disclose is a necessary element | 
of the tort of negligent misrepresentation. \ 
1 
7. Judgment <S=>181(33) \ 
Negligence <S=>210 \ 
Without a duty, there can be no negli- \ 
gence as a matter of law, and summary \ 
judgment is appropriate. ^ 
8. Fraud <£= 16 ] 
In order to establish fraudulent conceal- 1 
ment, a plaintiff must prove the following J 
three elements: (1) the nondisclosed informa-} 
tion is material, (2) the nondisclosed informa- \ 
tion is known to the party failing to disclose, ^ 
and (3) there is a legal duty to communicate.' \ 
9. Negligence <3^ 1692 \ 
The issue of whether a duty exists is; 
entirely a question of law to be determined : 
by the court. \\ 
\ 
10. Negligence <^211 H 
Torts <&*% * <\ 
Particularly in the realm of tort law, the 
duty concept is a policy determination. \ 
1L Fraud c=»17 jfJ 
Negligence <S=>1205(1,2) \ 
In order to protect unsophisticated pur-<| 
chasers, a developer, subdivider or person^  
performing similar tasks has a duty to exer| 
cise reasonable care to insure that the subdi-| 
vided lots are suitable for construction 6jJ 
some type of ordinary, average dwelling^  
house, and he must disclose to his purchaserj 
any condition which he knows or reasonAjfe 
ought to know makes the subdivided loty 
unsuitable for such residential building, ^ | 
SMITH v, FRANDSEN 
Cite as 94 P.3d 919 (Utah 2004) 
Utah 921 
has a further duty to disclose, upon inquiry, 
information he has developed in the course of 
the subdivision process which is relevant to 
fhe suitability of the land for its expected 
use. 
12. Fraud <3^ 17 
Negligence <s=>1205(2) 
Absent intentional fraud, the duty of a 
developer to exercise reasonable care to 
ensure subdivided lots are suitable for con-
struction and to disclose information devel-
oped during the subdivision process contin-
ues only until the vendee or his successor 
have had adequate time and opportunity, 
through occupation of the land or other-
wise, to discover the condition, and to take 
effective precautions against it by repair or 
other means; thus, the duties running from 
vendor to vendee and subvendee persist 
only until a subsequent purchaser knows or 
should know of a defect in the property. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 3&J. 
13. Negligence <3=>1205(1) 
Duty of care of subdivider which4 trans-
ferred1 subdivided land to developer and con-
tractor, which knew or should have known of 
defects in land, did not extend to ultimate 
home owners, as ultimate home owners were 
not similarly situated. 
14. Negligence <3>1205(2, 7) 
Like developers, the law imputes to 
builders and contractors a high degree of 
specialized knowledge and expertise with re-
gard to residential construction. 
15. Negligence <^1205(2, 7) 
Builder-contractors are expected to be 
famihar with conditions m the subsurface of 
the ground, 
16. Negligence <3>1205(2) 
- Where a developer conveys property to 
a residential contractor, the knowledge and 
expertise of the builder, and the independent 
duties owed thereby, interrupt certain obli-
gations running from the initial developer to 
subsequent purchasers. 
W. Contracts <3=>188.5(3) 
Where a subsequent purchaser of a resi-
dence is not similarly situated to the position 
of the original purchaser but rather possess-
es some unique insight or information with 
respect to the property, liability on the part 
of the contractor or developer to the original 
purchaser for a defect in the condition of the 
house may not be extended to subsequent 
purchasers. 
Stephen Quesenberry, J. Bryan Quesen-
berry, Provo, for plaintiffs. 
Michael W. Homer, Jesse C. Trentadue, 
Bret S. Hayman, Thomas B. Price, Salt Lake 
City, for defendant. 
DURHAM, Chief Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
H 1 Appellants, Steve and Catherine Smith 
(the Smiths), filed suit against appellee, Mel 
Frandsen dba Mary Mel Construction Com-
pany (Mary Mel), seeking compensatory and 
punitive damages for negligent misrepresen-
tation, negligence, and fraudulent conceal-
ment after the footings, foundation, and 
structure of their home settled, allegedly due 
to improper soil compaction and a general 
lack of lateral support. 
112 The trial court granted Mary Mel's 
motion for summary judgment, and the 
Smiths filed a timely notice of appeal We 
affirm. 
FACTS 
K3 In the early 1990s, Mary Mel pur-
chased land in Lehi City with the intention of 
developing the property for residential use. 
In the period up to 1995, Mary Mel obtained 
approval from local government agencies and 
constructed and installed the roads, curbs, 
gutters, sidewalk, and utilities in what is now 
the Summer Crest Subdivision. On October 
10, 1995, Mary Mel conveyed the properties, 
divided and improved, to Patterson Construc-
tion (Patterson), a residential developer with 
whom Mary Mel had an ongoing business 
relationship. Patterson, in turn, conveyed a 
portion of the property, lot 223, on the same 
day to GT Investments (GT) 
14 GT is a licensed general contractor. 
GT, acting through one of its employees, 
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Joseph Sharp (Sharp), constructed a home 
on lot 223. During construction, Sharp "per-
sonally inspected the . lot and viewed the 
condition of the lot before purchase and be-
fore building commenced." As the Smiths 
assert in their complaint, despite the fact 
that "the soil [on lot 223] was so soft that 
anyone walking on it would leave an im-
print," Sharp, allegedly as a result of his 
lack of experience in contracting, ignored 
this "red flag" and failed to order any soils 
testing or other measures that would have 
revealed that the soil on lot 223 was inade-
quately compacted. After completing con-
struction, GT delivered a warranty deed to 
the Smiths on August 26, 1996. 
115 Since occupying the home, the Smiths 
have experienced "significant settlement of 
the house, its footings, foundations and struc-
ture." In seeking recovery for damage 
caused by the subsidence, the Smiths argue 
that GT "knew, should have known, or negli-
gently failed to determine that the House 
was built on inadequate soil material and/or 
inadequately compacted soil." They addi-
tionally claim that in subdividing and devel-
oping the property prior to its conveyance to 
Patterson, Mary Mel performed "certain ex-
cavation work .. including filling in a low 
area or ravine" running through lot 223. As 
a result, the Smiths allege, Mary Mel "knew 
that the lot [included] unconsolidated fill, and 
failed to take proper steps to compact [the] 
lot, and in fact concealed and/or failed to 
disclose these facts to appropriate govern-
ment entities and prospective purchasers." 
It is upon these facts that the Smiths assert 
claims against GT, Sharp, Mary Mel, and 
Patterson. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1,2] 116 In reviewing a grant of sum-
mary judgment, we give no deference to the 
trial court with respect to its legal conclu-
sions. Armed Forces Ins Exch v Harrison, 
2003 UT 14, 1113, 70 P.3d 35. Rather, we 
make our own determination as to whether 
the record shows "that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Nev-
ertheless, we may affirm the result reached 
by the trial court " if it is sustainable on an * 
legal ground or theory apparent on the r^i 
ord,' even though that ground or theory \y« * 
not identified by the lower court as the basil 
of its ruling." Bond v. SDNCO, Inc., 2002I 
UT 83, H 10, 54 P.3d 1131, (quoting Ortonv 
Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998)] t l 
[3] fl 7 Mary Mel, pursuant to Utah Rule | 
Appellate Procedure 11(e)(2), urges thill 
court to uphold summary judgment, asse r t 
ing that since the appellants have failed w i 
provide a copy of the summary judgm&ifl 
hearing transcript, "the district court's Ae$m 
sions aire presumed to be valid." Howevgifl 
Mary Mel misconstrues the meaning of rulM 
11(e)(2). m 
K8 The rule simply requires appellants t/M 
include "a transcript of all evidence" relevaatj 
to a challenged finding or conclusion. \Jlwm 
R.App. P. 11(e)(2). In this case, neith/^ 
party claims that the missing transcript caril 
tains evidence bearing on the determination 
of the case. See Harper 1/. Summit Coun&fi 
963 P.2d 768, 775 n. 4 (Utah Ct.App.199S) 
rev'd in, part and vacated in part on o\ 
grounds by Harper v. Summit County, 20Qj 
UT 10, 26 P.3d 193. Thus, appellants had 
obligation to include the transcript in tKi 
record on appeal. 
ANALYSIS 
I. THEORIES OF LIABILITY 
[4] K 9 Appellants seek compensatory anj 
punitive damages against Mary Mel unde* 
three different theories of liability: negliged 
misrepresentation, negligence, and fraudu-
lent concealment. In order to prevail und| 
any of these causes of action, a plaintiff mi 
demonstrate the existence of a duty 
between the parties. For example, withj 
spect to negligent misrepresentation,
 t] 
stated in Jardine v. Brunsudck forporafoi 
18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659, 662 (1967), g 
"[w]here one .. carelessly or negligent 
makes a false representation . , e: 
the other party to rely and act thereon, *a| 
the other party reasonably does so and 
fers loss in that transaction, the represent 
SMITH v. FRANDSEN 
Cite as 94 P3d 919 (Utah 2004) 
Utah 923 
Sarf toe ^ e ^ r e sPo n s^le if the other elements 
;Yfraud are also present." l 
[5] % 10 Ordinarily, in order to prevail in 
*in action for negligent misrepresentation, 
l^ ntiffs must identify a "representor [who] 
makes an affirmative assertion which is 
false/' Ellis v Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 
j?2d 382, 385 (1962); see also Baskin u 
yi^igajge & Trust, Inc, 837 S.W.2d 743, 748 
(fexApp-1992) (upholding summary judg-
ment in favor of a third-party lender who 
jriade no representations to plaintiffs in con-
nection with the purchase of their homes). 
Indeed, Mary Mel makes a point of claiming 
thai it made no representations, false or true, 
fa the Smiths. The Smiths, however, con-
fend that by conveying 'the property (jointly 
$ith Patterson) without indicating that the 
lufwas unsuitable for construction, Mary Mel 
effected a representation to GT, which in 
turn made the same representation to them. 
~'[6] % 11 In the past, Utah cases have 
acknowledged that "negligent misrepresenta-
tion is a form of fraud,'1 Atkinson v. IHC 
iftwps., Inc, 798 R2d 733, 737 (Utah 1990); 
see also Christenson v. Commonwealth Land 
.Title Co, 666 P.2d 302, 305,(Utah 1983) 
("Negligent misrepresentation is a tort which 
grew out of common-law fraud."); Robinson 
v. Tripco Inv., Inc., 2000 UT App 200, % 31, 
21 P.3d 219 (Billings, J., dissenting) (identify-
ing negligent misrepresentation as a "spe-
cies" of fraud), Thus, interpreting the ele-
ments of the tort in a manner consistent with 
principles of common-law fraud, we have 
found that in addition to affirmative misstate-
ments, an omission may be actionable as a 
negligent misrepresentation where the defen-
dant has a duty to disclose. Swgarhousz 
Fin Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 
(Utah 1980) ("Misrepresentation may be 
riiade either by affirmative statement or by 
tnaterial omission, where there exists a duty 
to speak."); DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co, 
S35 P2d 1000, 1008 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (de-
nying liability for an "implied" misrepresen-
tation where the defendant mortgage compa-
ny owed no duty to disclose information to 
purchasers of real property). Thus, a duty 
to disclose is a necessary element of the tort 
of negligent misrepresentation. 
[7,8] f 12 In addition, it is well-estab-
lished in our law that "without a duty, there 
can be no negligence as a matter of law, and 
summary judgment is appropriate." Tall-
man v. City of Hurricane, 1999 UT 55, H 5, 
985 P.2d 892 (quoting Rocky Mountain 
Thrift Stores Inc v. Salt Lake City Corp,, 
887 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1994)). Finally, in 
order to establish fraudulent concealment, "a 
plaintiff must prove the following three ele-
ments: (1) the nondisclosed information is 
material, (2) the nondisclosed information is 
known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) 
there is a legal duty to communicate." Her-
mcmseu u Tosulis, 2,002, UT 52, % 24, 48 P.Sd 
235; see also Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App. 
291, f 10, 77 P.3d 339; McDougal v. Weed, 
945 R2d 175, 179 (Utah Ct.App.1997) 
("Fraudulent concealment requires that one 
with a legal duty or obligation to communi-
cate certain facts remain silent or otherwise 
act to conceal material facts knoton to him"). 
Therefore, a duty to disclose is material to 
each of the alleged causes of action. 
% 13 The pivotal question in this case is 
thus whether Mary Mel owed a duty to dis-
close the nature and existence of any subsur-
face defects, not only to its immediate succes-
sors in title, Patterson and GT, but also to 
the subsequent and more remote purchasers, 
the Smiths.2 
IL DUTY OF RESIDENTIAL REAL 
ESTATE DEVELOPERS TO 
REMOTE PURCHASERS 
A Defining the Limits of 
a Developer's Duty 
[9] K 14 "The issue of whether a duty 
exists is entirely a question of law to be 
}» We clarified this test m Price-Orem Inv Co v 2. Because we find the resolution of this issue 
, Mhnst Brown <fc Gunnell, Inc , 713 P 2d 55, 59 
n 2 (Utah 1986), wherein we indicated that the 
„ suggestion in Jardine that "all of the elements of 
^Jraud must also be proven is dictum Although 
we cause of action for negligent misrepresenta 
Uon grew out of common law fraud, the elements 
°f fraud need not be independently established " 
dispositive of the case, we decline to address the 
merits of Mary Mel's alternative argument that 
the Smith's allegation of negligent misrepresen-
tation is barred by the economic loss rule 
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determined by the court" Ferree u State, 
784 P2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). Covets con-
sider many factors, none of which is disposi-
tive, in determining when a duty runs be-
tween parties. DeBry v. Valley Mortgage 
Co., 835 P.2d, 1000, 1007 ("A duty to speak 
will be found from 'all the circumstances of 
the case and by comparing the facts not 
disclosed with the object and end in view by 
the contracting parties/ " (quoting Elder u 
Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P.2d 802, 804 
(1963) (citation omitted))),3 
[10] H 15 Particularly in the realm of tort 
law, "[t]he duty concept . . . is a policy deter-
mination." DeBry, 835 P.2d at 1003-04 
("Duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an 
expression of the sum total of those consider-
ations of policy which lead the law to say that 
the particular plaintiff is entitled to protec-
tion.") (citations omitted). For example, poli-
cy was one factor motivating our decision in 
Loveland u Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 
769 (Utah 1987), adopting the position of the 
Wyoming Supreme Court extending the duty 
of disclosure to developers engaged in subdi-
viding and improving lots for residential pur-
poses. In Anderson u Bauer, upon which 
Loveland relies, the Wyoming Supreme 
Court observed that "[a]s we developed from 
a rural to an urban society, . . . [b]uilders 
constructing great numbers of houses ac-
quired considerable knowledge and expertise 
in the area and used engineering services 
and studies to determine soil conditions . . . 
and other questions concerning suitability for 
3. See e.g., Pnce-Orem Inv. Co., 713 P.2d at 60 
(foreseeability); Christenson v. Commonwealth 
Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 
1983) (privity oC contract); Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah 
2d 279, 373 P.2d 382, 384-85 (1962) (statutory 
obligations); House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 886 
P.2d 542, 549-50 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (whether 
user possesses special knowledge, sophistication, 
or expertise). 
4. See also Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 
P.2d 733, 735 (Wyo.1979) ("The average pur-
chaser is without adequate knowledge or oppor-
tunity to make a meaningful inspection of the 
component parts of a residential structure."). 
5. See also Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 
P.2d 733, 735 (Wyo.1979) ("The average pur-
chaser is without adequate knowledge or oppor-
tunity to make a meaningful inspection of the 
component parts of a residential structure."). 
construction." 
1984V4 
681 P£d 1316, 1322 (tej 
[11] ^ 16 Therefore, in order to pr^ 
unsophisticated purchasers, under Lovefa 
a developer, subdivider or person perfoi 
similar tasks has 
a duty to exercise reasonable care t o | 
sure that the subdivided lots are suitab]| 
for construction o£ some type of on 
average dwelling house, and he must 
close to his purchaser any condition 
he knows or reasonably ought to knd 
makes the subdivided lots unsuitable f( 
such residential building. He has a 
ther duty to disclose, upon inquiry, injfoj 
mation he has developed in the course 
the subdivision process which is relevant, 
the suitability of the land for its ex] 
use. 
Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769.5 
[121 V 17 Notwithstanding our holding 1|| 
Loveland, the duties owed by contract^ 
and developers are not without limitati)| 
Even where a duty is found to exist, it dog 
not continue indefinitely. Absent intention| 
fraud, "it continues only until the vendee, m 
his successor, have had adequate time ah|| 
opportunity, through occupation of the lai|| 
or otherwise, to discover the existence of tl 
condition, and to take effective precautioi 
against it by repair or other means." 
statement (Second) of Torts § 353 cmt 
(1965).6 Thus, the duties running from w 
dor to vendee and subvendee persist onj 
6. See also House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 886 P .7 
542, 550 (Utah Ct.App.i994) (recognizing 
"sophisticated user doctrine" whereby the raaj 
focturar of ^ product is relve^d <& -& duty to \ 
of the inherent .dangers associated with a pr^ 
uct if the purchaser is a sophisticated user ana J 
charged with knowledge of the product); ^ | 
generally Uniform Land Sales Practices Act, Utg 
Code Ann. § 5 7 - H - 1 7 (2000) (relieving re4gj 
tate vendors of liability where "it is proved til 
the purchaser knew of the [vendor's] untruuiB 
omission"); Restatement (Second) of To|| 
§ 388 (1965); id. § 353 (a vendor of real propg 
ty is onl> liable for failing to disclose conditi^ 
on real property if the "the vendee does m 
know or have reason to know of the conditiQHj 
the risk involved, and the vendor has i 
to believe that the vendee will not discoverj 
condition or realize the risk"). 
until a subsequent purchaser 
should know of the defect in the property 
B Application to the Facts 
£13,14] H 18 In this case, there is no dis 
oute that Mary Mel conveyed the propeity to 
Patterson and then to GT. GT is a licensed 
general contractor in the state of Utah, and 
lilce developers, the law imputes to builders 
and contractors a high degree of specialized 
knowledge and expertise with regard to resi 
-dentiaL construction McDonald v Mia 
necfci, 79 N J 275, 398 A 2d 1283, 1292 (1979) 
("Whether the builder be large or small, the 
purchaser relies upon his superior knowledge 
$nd skill, and he impliedly represents that he 
is qualified to erect a habitable dwelling. He 
is also in a better position to prevent the 
existence of major defects "), Grojf v Pete 
Kmgsley Bldg, Inc, 374 Pa Super 377, 543 
jL2d 128, 133 (1988) ("The professional build-
er is expected to have the skill and expertise 
to know how to guard against potential struc-
tural problems Moreover, the builder is in 
the best position to prevent structural de 
fects*"), Moxley v Laramie Builders, Inc, 
600 P2d 733, 735 (Wyo 1979) ("Consumer 
protection demands that those who buy 
homes are entitled to rely on the skill of the 
builder and that the house is constructed so 
as to be reasonably fit for its intended use ") 
[151 U19 In particular, builder contrac-
tors are expected to be familiar with condi 
i^ohs in the subsurface of the ground See 
%obdla v Wisler, 59 Cal 2d 21, 27 Cal Rptr 
f9, 377 P.2d 889, 891 (1963) (holding a resi 
dential contractor negligent where "a reason 
Ifbly prudent person under like or similar 
jarcumstances and as a result of making said 
excavations for foundation footings would 
|ave discovered the insufficient compaction 
|f the underlying earth material, and would 
|ave caused soil tests and investigations to 
|§ made before proceeding with the build 
%*), ConoUey v Bull, 258 Cal App 2d 183, 
§ Cal Rptr 689, 697 (1968) (finding a con-
l^ctor was negligent for "constructing [a] 
o^use upon unstable and filled ground, con 
||Jung an underground spring, without tak-
ing protective steps foi providing adequate 
pipage"), ABC Builders, Inc v Phillips, 
®2 P2d 925, 938 (Wjo 1981) C We hold this 
SMITH v, FRANDSEN Utah 925 
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knows or to be the duty of ABC as builders to appel-
lees: To furnish a safe location for a residen-
tial structure, and it may be negligence to 
not do so") See generally Annotation, Duty 
of Contractor to Warn Owner of Defects in 
Subsurface Conditions, 73 A.L.R.3d 1213 
(1976) (collecting cases from various jurisdic-
tions in which "it was held that a contractor -
who knows, or should know, of a defect in a 
particular subsoil does not perform his con-
tractual obligations in a workmanlike manner 
if he fails to notify the owner of the existence 
of the condition"). 
f 20 The facts indicate that Sharp, the GT 
employee supervising the excavation and 
placement of the Smith's foundation, had "no 
prior construction experience." Neverthe-
less, GT is deemed to possess the knowledge 
of a reasonably prudent builder-contractor 
under similar circumstances, and, as a matter 
of law, a builder of ordinary prudence would 
have discovered the insufficient compaction 
on lot 223 See Coburn v Lenox Homes, 
Inc., 186 Conn. 370, 441 A.2d 620, 624 (1982); 
Foust u McKnight, 675 So.2d 1147, 1149 
(La.Ct.App 1996) ("[A] vendor-builder of a 
residence is considered to be a manufacturer, 
and as such he cannot avoid the conclusively 
presumptive knowledge of the defects in the 
thing he manufactures.") (citations omitted); 
Schamens v Crow, 326 So.2d 621, 626 (La.Ct. 
App.1975) (same); George B Gilmore Co v 
Garrett, 582 So.2d 387, 393 (Miss.1991); 
March v. Thiery, 729 S.W.2d 889, 894-95 
(Tex.Ct App. 1987) (imputing knowledge of 
faulty construction to residential builder). In 
addition, the Smiths themselves allege in 
their complaint that GT "knew, should have 
known, or negligently failed to determine 
that [their] house was built on inadequate 
sod material and/or uncompacted fill." 
[16] 1121 The parties agree that Mary 
Mel conveyed the property to Patterson and 
GT, both parties who, as a matter of law, 
possessed superior knowledge and expertise 
regarding the subsurface conditions on lot 
223. Where a developer conveys property to 
a residential contractor, the knowledge and 
expertise of the builder, and the independent 
duties owed thereby, interrupt certain obli-
gations running from the initial developer to 
subsequent purchasers In other words, 
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borrowing from the language of the Restate-
ment, we find that by conveying to one hav-
ing "adequate time and opportunity" to dis-
cover the subsurface defects in lot 223, Mary 
Mel incurred no liability to remote purchas-
ers of the property as a matter of law. See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353 cmt g 
(1965). Mary Mel had no duty extending 
beyond its conveyance to Patterson and GT, 
to both of which the law imputes a high 
degree of knowledge and expertise.7 
1122 The present case is distinguishable 
from those relied upon by the Smiths. For 
example, in Lawson v. Citizens & Southern 
National Bank of South Carolina, 255 S.C. 
517, 180 S.E.2d 206 (1971), the South Car-
olina Supreme Court found a developer had a 
duty to disclose to a subsequent purchaser 
that "in developing and subdividing its land 
into lots to be sold for residential use only, 
[it] filled an enormous gully with stumps and 
other rubble to a depth of twenty to twenty-
five feet and concealed this fill by covering it 
with soil." Id at 208. However, when that 
case was decided in 1971, builder-contractors 
were not universally held to the same high 
standards that they are today. As the cases 
cited above indicate, the adoption of builder-
contractor liability is a fairly recent phenom-
enon.8 See Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So.2d 654, 
657 n. 2 (Fla.1983) (documenting a trend 
beginning in the late 1960s and extending 
through the early 1980s whereby builder-
vendors were held liable to immediate pur-
chasers under an implied warranty of habita-
bility). 
H 23 Appellants also point to Anderson v. 
Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316 (Wyo.1984). In that 
case, the court placed primary responsibility 
on builders and contractors to ensure the 
suitability of the land for construction of 
residences. There, the lots at issue were 
suitable for some form of dwelling house, 
although some of the lots were admittedly 
unfit for homes with basements. Id at 1323. 
But, as the court observed, "whether the 
particular house to be built was a house with 
no basement, a half basement, a tri-level 
7. In doing so we do not address the merits of any 
suit involving Patterson, GT and the Smiths or 
between Mary Mel and GT 
house, or a full basement was a decision 3 
involving the developer." Id Therefore, d l 
court relied on the knowledge and judgnaenjf 
of the builder in finding that the developJj 
had satisfied his duty and was not liable 1 
homeowners. Likewise, our decision 
requires contractors to be accountable, eith 
directly or through explicit warranties frm 
their predecessors in title, for the suitabilitj 
of the land upon which they build. 
f 24 Those cases that do find develop! 
liable ,to remote purchasers involve factiii 
settings in which the developer was also 
builder-contractor or otherwise include' 
chain of title with no intermediate sop] 
cated purchaser. See Barnhouse v. City'i 
Pinole, 133 CaLApp.3d 171,183 Cal.Rptr 
(1982); Washington Rd Developers, LLC 1 
Weeks, 249 Ga.App. 582, 549 S.E.2d 4 
(2001); Moxley v Laramie Builders, iW 
600 P.2d 733 (Wyo.1979). ' J 
u 
C Policy Implications \ 
% 25 Our holding today furthers the puS 
poses and policies underlying the recogniz||| 
exceptions to the doctrine of caveat empi 
and is not inconsistent with our prior caselaj 
on duty issues generally, or Utah statu! 
As a result of their superior knowledge, 
dential home-builders in other jurisdictioi 
have consistently been held liable to sui 
quent as well as immediate purchasers. Co\ 
mopolitan Homes, Inc v. Wetter, 663 P. 
1041, 1044-^5 (Colo.1983) (citing cases 
eight different states in which subsequen] 
purchasers were held able to state a cl 
for negligence against a builder); see 
Timothy E. Travers, American Law of Prj 
ucts Liability § 38:19 (3d ed.1987); Mfcf 
A DeSabatino, Liability of Builder of R< 
dencefor Latent Defects Therein as Runnl 
to Subsequent Purchasers from Ongil 
Vendee, 10 AL.R.4th 385 (1981). Just as 
lack of purchaser sophistication motivai 
the initial exceptions to the doctrine of caV£ 
emptor, the expansion of builder-contrad 
liability to encompass even remote purcfa 
3. Stepanov v Gavnlovich, 594 P 2d 30 (AlgS 
L979)f also relied on by the Smiths, is inappojjj 
because it involves a suit brought by resident^ 
contractors, rather than homeowners, again#| 
developer 
erS is similarly driven. 
> of residential construction, subsequent 
,
 orneowners typically possess no greater so-
' jiistication that would enable them to dis-
cover latent defects in the property. Tusch 
firiters v. Coffin,. 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 
1022, 1034 (1987) (" The same policy consid-
erations that lead to [our adoption of the 
implied warranty of habitability for sales of 
new homes] . . . are equally applicable to 
subsequent homebuyers.' " (quoting Rich-
ards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc, 139 Ariz. 
242, 678 P.2d 427, 430 (1984))); see also 
pwight F. Hopewell, C. Oates v. Jag- Let the 
Buyer Beware—A Remedy for Subsequent 
Purchasers of Homes in North Carolina, 64 
N.C L.Rev. 1485, 1493 (1986) ("[A] subse-
quent purchaser of real estate is in a very 
similar position to that of the initial purchas-
er. Both are innocent purchasers who lack 
the expertise and knowledge necessary to 
uncover every latent defect . Thus, both 
classes of purchasers deserve equal protec-
tion"). 
[17] 1126 By implication, where a subse-
quent purchaser is not similarly situated but 
rather possesses some unique insight or in-
formation with respect to the property, liabil-
ity may not be extended to subsequent pur-
chasers. See Tusch Enters., 740 P.2d at 1038 
(Shepard, J., dissenting) (arguing that liabili-
ty should be denied where "[tjhe plaintiffs 
.. are not unknowing buyers of a residence 
built by an unscrupulous builder/developer[.] 
Rather, plaintiffs are a sophisticated and 
knowledgeable group of investors in real es-
tate"). As the cases cited above indicate, 
residential builders and contractors are not 
innocent transferees occupying the same po-
sition as the ultimate residential consumer. 
Extending the liability of developers beyond 
builder-contractors to encompass remote 
purchasers is inconsistent with the rationale 
upon which recovery by subsequent purchas-
ers was initially based. 
H 27 As a policy matter, we believe that out-
holding will encourage builders and contrac-
t s to exercise that level of care consistent 
with the expertise legally imputed to them. 
9. 
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Like initial consum- In addition, our decision preserves the con-
it is, of course, likely that increases in costs 
incurred b) builders will be passed on to pur-
chasers, but presumably those increases will be 
tractual expectations of developers and build-
er-contractors. If unstable soil conditions 
are known to both the developer and the 
builder-transferee, the price of the land may 
be discounted to reflect the added cost in-
volved in correcting the defect. See Trans-
america Ins, Servs. v. Kopko, 570 N.E.2d 
1283, 1284 (Ind.1991) (dealing with a proper-
ty transaction in which a buyer "was given a 
credit against the purchase price of [a] new 
lot to compensate [the buyer] for the expense 
they incurred in correcting the soil conditions 
on the previous lot"). By requiring plaintiffs 
generally to sue up the chain of title, the 
allocation of risk and expectations embodied 
in land sale contracts will be preserved.9 
CONCLUSION 
U 28 We hold that Mary Mel's duty of care 
and disclosure extended only to its immedi-
ate transferees, Patterson and GT, who 
"knew or should have known" of defects in 
the property, and not to the appellants. The 
order granting summary judgment is af-
firmed. 
129 Justice PARRISH and Justice 
NEHRING concur in Chief Justice 
DURHAM'S opinion. 
WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice, 
concurring in the result: 
1130 I concur with the conclusion reached 
by the majority opinion that Mary Mel owed 
no duty to the Smiths, and that as such a 
summary judgment in Mary Mel's favor was 
proper. Mary Mel conveyed the lot to Pat-
terson Construction, who conveyed to GT 
Investments, who conveyed to the Smiths. 
No theory advanced by the Smiths supports 
extension of a duty to disclose that far. The 
remaining analysis regarding the duty of 
home builders to disclose subsurface condi-
tions to buyers is dicta at best. 
1131 We need not, nor are we asked to 
consider the duty, if any, running from a 
home builder to a home buyer to disclose 
non-obvious defects in the land that may or 
outweighed by losses avoided because of higher 
standards in the building process 
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may not be known by the builder. To do so 
in this case simply extends our analysis not 
only beyond the facts and law considered by 
the trial court, but also beyond the facts and 
law necessary to resolve the case. There is 
no need for us to rely on the law of numerous 
other jurisdictions to fashion a new duty 
under Utah law to be imposed on home 
builders. 
K 32 As a result, I would affirm the trial 
court on the sole basis that the law imposed 
no duty on Mary Mel to disclose anything 
regarding the condition of the property to 
the Smiths, and that as a direct result tl 
causes of action advanced by the Smitj 
against Mary Mel fail as a matter of 1^  
133 Justice DURRANT concurs in 
Associate Chief Justice WILKINS' 
concurring opinion. 
